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Chun Wang
Portfolio management has always been a key topic in finance research area. While many
researchers have studied portfolio management problems, most of the work to date assumes
trading is frictionless. This dissertation presents our investigation of the optimal trading
policies and efforts of applying duality method based on information relaxations to portfolio
problems where the investor manages multiple securities and confronts trading frictions, in
particular capital gain taxes and execution cost.
In Chapter 2, we consider dynamic asset allocation problems where the investor is re-
quired to pay capital gains taxes on her investment gains. This is a very challenging prob-
lem because the tax to be paid whenever a security is sold depends on the tax basis, i.e.
the price(s) at which the security was originally purchased. This feature results in high-
dimensional and path-dependent problems which cannot be solved exactly except in the
case of very stylized problems with just one or two securities and relatively few time periods.
The asset allocation problem with taxes has several variations depending on: (i) whether
we use the exact or average tax-basis and (ii) whether we allow the full use of losses (FUL)
or the limited use of losses (LUL). We consider all of these variations in this chapter but
focus mainly on the exact and average-cost tax-basis LUL cases since these problems are the
most realistic and generally the most challenging. We develop several sub-optimal trading
policies for these problems and use duality techniques based on information relaxations to
assess their performances. Our numerical experiments consider problems with as many as 20
securities and 20 time periods. The principal contribution of this chapter is in demonstrating
that much larger problems can now be tackled through the use of sophisticated optimization
techniques and duality methods based on information-relaxations. We show in fact that the
dual formulation of exact tax-basis problems are much easier to solve than the corresponding
primal problems. Indeed, we can easily solve dual problem instances where the number of
securities and time periods is much larger than 20. We also note, however, that while the
average tax-basis problem is relatively easier to solve in general, its corresponding dual prob-
lem instances are non-convex and more difficult to solve. We therefore propose an approach
for the average tax-basis dual problem that enables valid dual bounds to still be obtained.
In Chapter 3, we consider a portfolio execution problem where a possibly risk-averse agent
needs to trade a fixed number of shares in multiple stocks over a short time horizon. Our price
dynamics can capture linear but stochastic temporary and permanent price impacts as well
as stochastic volatility. In general it’s not possible to solve even numerically for the optimal
policy in this model, however, and so we must instead search for good sub-optimal policies.
Our principal policy is a variant of an open-loop feedback control (OLFC) policy and we
show how the corresponding OLFC value function may be used to construct good primal and
dual bounds on the optimal value function. The dual bound is constructed using the recently
developed duality methods based on information relaxations. One of the contributions of
this chapter is the identification of sufficient conditions to guarantee convexity, and hence
tractability, of the associated dual problem instances. That said, we do not claim that the
only plausible models are those where all dual problem instances are convex. We also show
that it is straightforward to include a non-linear temporary price impact as well as return
predictability in our model. We demonstrate numerically that good dual bounds can be
computed quickly even when nested Monte-Carlo simulations are required to estimate the
so-called dual penalties. These results suggest that the dual methodology can be applied in
many models where closed-form expressions for the dual penalties cannot be computed.
In Chapter 4, we apply duality methods based on information relaxations to dynamic
zero-sum games. We show these methods can easily be used to construct dual lower and
upper bounds for the optimal value of these games. In particular, these bounds can be used
to evaluate sub-optimal policies for zero-sum games when calculating the optimal policies
and game value is intractable.
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Dynamic asset allocation and portfolio execution are the two vital components of finan-
cial portfolio management, and they have received considerable attention over the past two
decades. Most of the work to date assumes trading is frictionless, however investors do con-
front trading friction in real financial markets. Taxation and execution cost are perhaps the
two most significant factors in friction, and they indeed impact the performance of invest-
ment. For example, the magnitude of the capital gain taxes could be quite large, typical
from 20% to 30%. We investigate the optimal portfolio policy when the investor is subject
to capital gain taxes or trading incurs execution cost. Integrating the friction into dynamic
portfolio optimization problems leads extraordinary complexity, and the difficulty increases
rapidly with number of assets due to the well-known “curse-of-dimensionality”, so in gen-
eral it is not possible to solve for the optimal policy and we must instead search for good
sub-optimal policies. But how good are these sub-optimal policies? In this dissertation we
2
primarily focus on portfolio optimization problems and explore the use of the recent devel-
oped duality methods based on information relaxations to evaluate how far from optimality
these sub-optimal policies can be. In the end we extend these dual methods to dynamic
zero-sum games.
1.1 Tax-Aware Dynamic Asset Allocation
Dynamic asset allocation problems have played a central problem in finance since the pioneer-
ing work of Samuelson [62], Merton [54] and Hakannson [40]. Since then many researchers
have studied the problem of how to dynamically allocate wealth among financial securities
in order to optimize a given objective function which is typically some combination of the
expected utility of terminal wealth and lifetime consumption. Most work considers prob-
lems with frictionless markets, and different problem formulations are typically obtained by
varying the price dynamics and / or agent preferences. Relatively little work, however, has
focussed on asset allocation in the presence of capital gains taxes. This is not because the
problem is unimportant. Indeed the problem of how to efficiently invest and re-balance a
portfolio in the presence of capital gains taxes is of considerable interest to investors and
academics alike. Rather the problem has received relatively little attention because it is so
challenging to solve. This is because the taxes that are owed whenever a security is sold
generally depends on its tax basis, i.e. the price(s) at which the security was originally pur-
chased. This feature results in high-dimensional and path-dependent problems which can
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only be solved for extremely simple cases. In Chapter 2, we consider dynamic asset allocation
problems where the investor is required to pay capital gains taxes on her investment gains.
Constantinides [20] was among the first to study the asset allocation problem with taxes.
He showed that the optimal investment policy can be separated from the tax timing problem
if short-sales are allowed and are costless. In particular, when an investor needs to reduce
her position in a stock with an embedded capital gain, she prefers to short sell the stock
rather than selling from her current holdings1. She, therefore, succeeds in re-balancing her
portfolio without triggering a tax liability. In practice, of course, short-sales incur collateral
costs and may also not be permitted by the tax authorities2.
Dybvig and Koo [30] studied the asset allocation problem with taxes when short-sales
constraints are imposed so that the separation result of Constantinides does not apply. They
formulated the problem using the so-called exact tax basis and solved a problem with just one
risky stock and four time periods. More recently, DeMiguel and Uppal [28] used a stochastic
programming approach to solve problems with just one stock and ten time periods, as well
as problems with two stocks and seven time periods. Unfortunately, solving larger problems
is numerically intractable because the number of state variables and number of constraints
grows exponentially with the number of time periods.
An alternative modeling approach is to use the average tax basis when determining
tax liabilities. The average tax basis for a given security is the weighted average purchase
price of the current holdings of the security in the portfolio. The U.S tax code currently
1This strategy is sometimes referred to as “shorting the box”.
2The 1997 Tax Reform Act in the U.S rules out “shorting the box” transactions.
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allows investors to choose between using the exact tax basis and the average tax basis in
determining their tax liabilities. While using the average tax basis is generally sub-optimal
from the investor’s point of view, it requires less record-keeping, and from a modeling point
of view, does not result in the exponential explosion of state variables that occurs when the
exact tax basis is used. Average tax-basis problems are therefore more amenable to dynamic
programming (DP) but are nonetheless still challenging to solve. In particular due to the
so-called “curse-of-dimensionality” it is only possible to exactly solve problems with just one
or two stocks even when the average tax basis is used.
Dammon et al. [23, 25] were among the first to consider the average tax-basis problem.
They considered problems with just one stock and multiple time periods. Dammon et al. [24]
and Garlappi et al. [35] considered the case of two stocks. Gallmeyer et al. [34] solved a two-
stock problem as well as a problem with just one stock and a put option on that stock. It
is worth noting that DeMiguel and Uppal [28] showed that the certainty equivalent loss in
wealth was small when using the average tax basis instead of the exact tax basis. Although
they only showed this for the relatively small problem sizes they considered, one would expect
this observation to hold more generally. Tahar et al. [67] formulated the continuous time
version of the model in Dammon et al. [23] and studied properties of the value function in a
one-stock infinite horizon problem.
We also note that most of the literature on tax-aware asset allocation assumes the so-
called full use of losses (FUL) model where the net capital losses in any given period result
in an immediate tax rebate. This is in contrast to the limited use of losses (LUL) model
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where the net capital losses do not result in an immediate tax rebate; instead, the net losses
can only be used to offset capital gains in future periods. Only the LUL model is consistent
with the tax codes encountered in practice; but LUL problems are more challenging to solve
than FUL problems since in the LUL case we need to keep track of the sum of prior losses
that have not already been used to offset gains. Gallmeyer and Srivastava [33] discussed
the impact of the LUL model while more recently, Ehling et al. [31] solved a two-stock
average-tax basis LUL problem with 80 time periods3.
While we consider all variations of tax-basis and use-of-losses assumptions, we will focus
mainly on the exact and average-cost tax-basis LUL cases, since these problems are perhaps
the most realistic, and generally the most challenging. We develop several sub-optimal trad-
ing policies for these problems and use duality techniques based on information relaxations
to assess their performances. So instead of trying to solve these problems exactly we settle
for provably good sub-optimal solutions. Our numerical experiments consider problems with
as many as twenty securities and twenty time periods.
The principal contribution of Chapter 2 is to demonstrate that much larger problems
can now be tackled through the use of sophisticated optimization techniques and duality
methods based on information-relaxations [16, 60]. These dual methods can be used to
compute dual bounds on the optimal value function of stochastic dynamic programs. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to construct valid dual bounds for tax-aware
dynamic asset allocation problems. We show that the dual formulations of the exact tax-
3Note that their algorithm requires 90 hours with 100 CPUs working in parallel to solve the problem.
They do not provide processor or software details.
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basis problems are much easier to solve than the corresponding primal problems. We can
easily solve dual problem instances where the number of securities and time periods is much
larger than twenty. While the average tax-basis (primal) problem is relatively easier to solve
than the exact tax basis (primal) problem, the dual of the average tax-basis problem is
non-convex and thus more difficult to solve. We therefore propose approaches for bounding
these dual problem instances so that valid lower and upper bounds for the average tax-basis
problem can still be obtained. While we only consider problems where short-term and long-
term capital gains are both taxed at the same rate, it will be clear that we can easily handle
asymmetric tax rates.
1.2 Dynamic Portfolio Execution with Transaction Cost
Dynamic portfolio execution is one of the most important practical problems faced by in-
stitutional investors and brokerage firms today. This problem requires the purchase or sale
of a large number of shares in multiple stocks over a short time horizon. The large number
of shares and short time horizon can result in a very significant market impact that can in
turn greatly increase the cost of trading. This of course is in contrast to traditional dynamic
portfolio optimization problems where trading is generally assumed to be frictionless. Be-
cause of the potentially large trading costs, it is necessary to model market impact explicitly
when determining portfolio execution policies.
The literature on controlling execution costs is extensive and we can barely do justice
to it here. Most of the early work, beginning with Bertsimas and Lo [11] and Almgren and
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Chriss [6], considered single-stock execution problems which they formulated as dynamic
control problems. Other related work in this spirit includes, for example, Almgren [4],
Huberman and Stanzl [44] and Gatheral and Schied [37]. Generally these papers consider
the macro or scheduling component of the execution problem, that is, the problem of deciding
how to slice the order, when the execution algorithm should trade and in what size. These
models might, for example, take a time horizon of 1 day and break this period up into
5-minute time periods. Assuming a trading day of 6.5 hours duration, this yields a finite-
horizon control problem with 78 time periods.
In the last decade, the growth of electronic exchange markets has led to the modeling of
limit order book dynamics. These models, beginning with Obizhaeva and Wang [56], and
extended by Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied [2] and Predoiu, Shaikhet and Shreve [58], model the
market impact and the decay of market impact at the limit order book level. Often formu-
lated as continuous-time problems, the resulting stochastic control problems generally yield
deterministic execution policies due to the assumption of relatively simple price dynamics.
These papers can also be viewed as considering the scheduling component of the execution
policy although they are inspired by micro foundations in that they model the transient
behavior of the limit order book. They assume that trades are executed as market orders
whose price impact depends on the shape of the order book at the time of execution. In
contrast, Cont and Kukanov [21] and Huitema [46] consider the use of both limit and market
orders. Other papers related to execution in limit order books include, for example, Cont,
Stoikov and Talreja [22] and Gatheral [36], while Toth et al. [69] focus on market impact
rather than execution.
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More recently so-called dark pools have grown in importance as an alternative form of
trading. There is no order book in dark pool venues and buyers/sellers are matched elec-
tronically without revealing any information. Trades in dark pools generally have a smaller
price impact but order execution is uncertain. Recent work on optimal execution in these
venues include for example Kratz and Schoneborn [48], and Buti et al. [17], both of which
consider the use of a classical exchange and dark pools for optimal execution.
While most research has focussed on the single-stock execution problem, there has also
been some work on the portfolio execution problem. Early work in this direction, which again
focuses on the macro component of the problem, includes Bertsimas, Hummel and Lo [10]
and Almgren and Chriss [5]. More recent work includes Huberman and Stanzl [45], Schied,
Schoneborn and Tehranci [63] and Lim and Wimonkittiwat [51]. Giesecke, Tsoukalas and
Wang [70] consider the portfolio execution problem at the limit order book level and formu-
late their control problem as an equivalent static convex optimization problem. In another
recent paper, Moallemi and Saglam [55] consider general dynamic portfolio optimization
problems, including portfolio execution problems, and propose optimizing over linear re-
balancing rules in order to find good sub-optimal policies. Their optimization problem is
therefore static in nature and amenable to standard convex optimization algorithms. Their
paper is quite similar in spirit to our work in that they also focus on developing good sub-
optimal policies and also use duality based on information relaxations to demonstrate the
effectiveness of these policies.
In Chapter 3 we consider the portfolio execution problem of a possibly risk-averse agent
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who needs to account for temporary and permanent market impact costs, as well as other
market features such as stochastic liquidity and return predictability among others. We for-
mulate the problem, search for good sub-optimal policies, and again use the duality method
based on information relaxations to evaluate these sub-optimal policies. We also recognize
that even “realistic” models are still only an approximation to the true market dynamics,
and we therefore study how these dual methods can also be used to estimate how robust a
given policy is to departures from the assumed model. An additional contribution of this
chapter is that valid and tight dual bounds can still be computed efficiently even when the
dual penalties are not explicitly available and need to be estimated using Monte-Carlo.
1.3 Information Relaxations and Dynamic Zero-Sum
Games
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we use dual methods based on information relaxations to assess
the performance of sub-optimal policies for tax-aware dynamic asset allocation problem and
dynamic portfolio execution problem respectively. The use of duality techniques to construct
good bounds for dynamic control problems began independently with Haugh and Kogan [41]
and Rogers [59] in the context of optimal stopping problems and the pricing of American
options. See also Andersen and Broadie [7] and Jamshidian [47]. These techniques were
then extended to multiple optimal stopping problems by Meinshausen and Hambly [53] and
Schoenmakers [64]. Bender [8] and Bender, Schoenmakers and Zhang [9] provided further
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extensions of this work. A significant development came with Brown, Smith and Sum [16]
(hereafter denoted by BSS) and Rogers [60], who independently extended these duality
techniques to more general stochastic dynamic programs. This has now become a very
significant research area. More recent applications and developments can be found in Brown
and Smith [15], Desai, Farias and Moallemi [29], Lai, Margot and Secomandi [49], Lai et
al [50], Moallemi and Saglam [55] and Haugh and Lim [42]. The latter paper makes the
point that some of the ideas behind these dual techniques are actually not so recent and
date back to earlier work, including Davis and Karatzas [26] in the case of American options,
and Davis and Zervos [27] for linear-quadratic control. Chandramouli and Haugh [18] also
showed that the earlier duality results for multiple optimal stopping problems could easily
be derived using the more general framework of BSS [16]. We provide a brief review of
the duality theory based on information relaxations in Appendix C. We refer the reader to
BSS [16] for the theoretical details underpinning the dual methods.
In Chapter 4 which is the last part of this dissertation, we apply these duality methods to
dynamic two-person zero-sum games. Our extension of the information relaxation technology
to dynamic zero-sum games is motivated in part by Beveridge and Joshi [12] who generalized
the dual optimal stopping work of Haugh and Kogan [41] and Rogers [59] to zero-sum optimal
stopping games. The main contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate that the more
general dual approach of BSS [16] and Rogers [60] can also be easily applied to dynamic
zero-sum games. While the results are easy to prove, there are many interesting applications
including pursuit-evasion games, heads-up poker and many two-person computer games.
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Our ultimate goal is to apply these dual techniques to very complex zero-sum games which
cannot be solved to optimality.
12
Chapter 2
Tax-Aware Dynamic Asset Allocation
2.1 Introduction
The challenges of the tax-aware dynamic asset allocation problem root in the taxation code.
In order to compute capital gains or losses, the taxation code needs to specify the tax basis
to which the selling price of a security will be compared. The exact tax basis is defined as the
price at which the security was originally purchased. This feature results in path-dependent
problems because the investor is required to keep track of the basis price for every single
transaction along the investment, and therefore problems cannot be solved exactly except in
the case of just one or two securities and relatively few time periods. An alternative modeling
approach is to use the average tax basis, which is defined as the weighted average purchase
price of the current holdings of a security, to tackle with the path dependency. Average
tax-basis problem requires less record-keeping. However, due to ”curse-of-dimensionality” it
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is still hard to be solved exactly if there are many securities in the portfolio. The taxation
code also needs to specify how the realized capital losses can be used to offset gains. Most
of the literature asumes the so-called full use of losses (FUL) model where the investor faces
no restrictions on the use of losses and the net capital losses generate a tax rebate which can
be immediately invested. This is in contrast to the limited use of losses (LUL) model where
the investor can only use realzied capital losses to offset current realized capital gains and
unused capital losses can be carried forward to future trading dates. Only the LUL model
is consistent with the tax codes in practice, however, LUL problems are more difficulty to
solve than FUL problems becuase the accumulated unused losses has to be tracked.
The tax-aware asset allocation problem has several variations depending on the tax basis
adopted and the rule of using losses. We consider all of these variations but focus on the exact
and average tax-basis LUL cases because they are the most realistic and most challenging.
We investigate several sub-optimal trading policies and use the duality techniques based on
information relaxations to evaluate the quality of their performances. The remainder of this
chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we formulate the problem, focusing mainly on
the exact tax-basis LUL case. We describe our sub-optimal policies for tackling this problem
in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes how we use duality techniques based on information
relaxations to construct dual bounds for these problems. We describe our numerical results
in Section 2.5 and conclude in Section 2.6. In Appendix A.1 we give additional details on
how we solve for the sub-optimal policies while in Appendix A.2 we discuss the exact tax-
basis FUL problem in further detail. In Appendices A.3 and A.4, we consider the average
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tax-basis LUL and FUL problems, respectively, and describe how the non-convexity of the
corresponding dual problem instances can be addressed.
2.2 Problem Formulation
We consider the problem of a risk-averse agent who can trade in multiple assets over a fixed
time horizon. The agent is also required to pay taxes on any realized capital gains that she
incurs. Our framework is an extension of the multiple assets model of Dybvig and Koo [30]
and DeMiguel and Uppal [28]. We consider a discrete-time economy with equally spaced
trading dates t = 0, 1, ..., T . The security market consists of a risk-free cash account and K
risky securities. We let bt denote the cash-account holding at time t and assume it earns
an after-tax risk-free return of r0 per period. We let pt,k denote the time-t price of the
k-th risky security and let nj,t,k denote the number of units of this security that was bought
at time j for j = 0, ..., t and still held after trading at time t for t = 0, ..., T . The exact
tax-basis of these nj,t,k units is then given by pj,k
1. We define the time-t stock price vector
pt := [pt,1 . . . pt,K ]
′ and time-t stock holding vector nj,t := [nj,t,1 . . . nj,t,K ]
′ for j = 0, ..., t.
We also assume that borrowing and short-sales are prohibited so that the aforementioned
separation result of Constantinides [20] does not apply.
In most of the previous literature2, the tax aware portfolio selection problem is formulated
using the FUL model where the realized capital losses earn an immediate tax rebate. In
1We discuss the average tax-basis problem in Appendices A.3 and A.4.
2See, e.g. Dybvig and Koo [30], Dammon et al. [23, 24, 25], Garlappi et al. [35], DeMiguel and Uppal [28],
Gallmeyer et al. [34] and Tahar et al. [67].
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practice, however, tax codes only allow for the limited use of losses in that an investor can
only use realized capital losses to offset realized capital gains. Unused capital losses can then
be carried forward to offset future capital gains. In this chapter we will focus mainly on the
more challenging LUL model.3 Let gt denote the time t capital gains and let lt denote the
accumulated unused realized capital losses after trading at time t. Then the LUL tax rule




(pt − pj)′(nj,t−1 − nj,t) + lt−1 (2.2.1)
gt = max{ct, 0} (2.2.2)
lt = min{ct, 0}. (2.2.3)
Since nj,t−1−nj,t denotes the number of units of securities that were purchased at time j and
sold at time t, the tax basis for these securities is pj; therefore, ct is the total realized capital
gains or losses from trading at time t after offsetting by the accumulated unused realized
capital losses lt−1 carried forward from the previous periods. When ct is positive, the taxable
capital gains gt is set to ct; otherwise ct is negative and represents the total unused realized
losses. We assume that the unused realized losses can be carried forward all the way to
the final period T . We also assume that both long-term and short-term capital gains are
taxed at the same rate τ . Note, however, that we could relax both of these assumptions by
introducing additional state variables.
The goal is to maximize the agent’s expected utility of terminal after-tax wealth b. We
3We discuss the FUL model in Appendices A.2 and A.4.
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1−γ γ > 0 and γ ̸= 1
ln(b) γ = 1
(2.2.4)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The tax-aware asset allocation problem









s.t. b0 + p
′




p′tnj,t + τgt = bt−1r0 +
t−1∑
j=0
p′tnj,t−1 t ≥ 1 (2.2.7)
nt,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 0 (2.2.8)
nj,t−1 ≥ nj,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 1, j < t (2.2.9)
bt ≥ 0 t ≥ 0 (2.2.10)
gt + lt =
t−1∑
j=0
(pt − pj)′(nj,t−1 − nj,t) + lt−1 t ≥ 1 (2.2.11)
gt ≥ 0 t ≥ 1 (2.2.12)
lt ≤ 0, l0 = 0 t ≥ 1 (2.2.13)
and security price and state variable dynamics
where we use {Ft}t=0,...,T to denote the filtration generated by the security price vectors
as well as any other state variables in the model. The investor is assumed to have an
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initial wealth w0; therefore, constraint (2.2.6) is the initial budget constraint. The budget
constraints for t ≥ 1 are in (2.2.7) where the right-hand side is the pre-trade wealth at time
t and the sum of the first two terms on the left-hand side represents the post-trade wealth
after paying the capital gains taxes τgt. The decision variables nj,t allow the agent to track
the exact tax basis of each share in the portfolio. Short-selling is ruled out by constraints
(2.2.8) and (2.2.9). In addition, (2.2.9) also reflects the fact that any shares purchased at
time j can only be sold in later periods. Constraint (2.2.10) prohibits borrowing via the cash
account.
The taxable capital gain gt is required to be non-negative so the agent can never receive
a tax rebate in (2.2.7). Since paying additional taxes is always sub-optimal, the optimal
solution of (2.2.5) will never simultaneously have gt > 0 and lt < 0. We can therefore
replace the LUL tax rule described in (2.2.1)-(2.2.3) with constraints (2.2.11)-(2.2.13). We
also assume an initial unused loss l0 = 0.
We assume the after-tax return r0 of the risk-free cash account is constant over time.
The gross return of the k-th risky security between times t − 1 and t is denoted by rt,k.
We assume this return is stochastic and define the time t return vector, rt := [rt,1 ... rt,K ]
′.
Without loss of generality, the initial stock prices are set to one, i.e., p0 = [1 ... 1]
′ and we
assume the price dynamics are given by
pt = pt−1 · rt, (2.2.14)
where · denotes the componentwise multiplication. In contrast to most of the literature
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which assumes IID price dynamics, we assume rt+1 is driven by a Markovian state vector zt
so that rt+1 is independent of rj for all j ≤ t conditional on zt.




t,t gt lt] and
p0:t := [p
′
0 . . . p
′
t]
′ which is a vector of the prices of all risky securities up to and including
time t. xt−1 and p0:t completely describe the positions and tax basis of the agents’s portfolio
before trading at time t. We denote the set of feasible trades at time t by Xt. Thus,
X0 :=
{




xt | xt ∈ Ft satisfies constraints (2.2.7)–(2.2.13) at time t
}
, t ≥ 1.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to solve the exact tax-basis LUL problem due to the large
number of state variables, constraints and path-dependence induced by the need to keep
track of the tax basis for each security. Instead we seek good sub-optimal policies which
is the subject of Section 2.3. But first we discuss the problem where the agent does not
have to pay capital gains taxes. The solution to this no-tax problem will be of use to us
in constructing some of our sub-optimal policies as well as constructing dual bounds on the
optimal value function for the exact tax-basis LUL problem.
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The No-Tax Problem Formulation
In the no-tax problem capital gains are not taxed so that τ = 0. The portfolio optimization
problem can then be solved using dynamic programming (DP) as long as the dimension of
the exogenous state vector zt is sufficiently small.
Let V Nt (wt, zt) denote the time-t optimal value function for the no-tax problem. Although
the current wealth wt is a state variable, it is well known that wealth can be factored out
when the utility function belongs to CRRA class, i.e.



















s.t. b̃t + 1
′ñt = 1 (2.2.17)
b̃t ≥ 0, ñt ≥ 0. (2.2.18)
b̃t and ñt denote the post-trade fractions of wealth wt invested in the cash account and risky
securities, respectively. The time-t conditional expectation in (2.2.16) is taken over the next
period’s return vector rt+1 and the state vector, zt+1. The budget constraint is given by
(2.2.17) and (2.2.18) are the no borrowing and no short-sales constraints respectively. In
this case, the dimension of the state space is equal to the dimension of the state vector zt
and so we can solve V Nt numerically over a fine grid of possible values of zt if the dimension
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of zt is sufficiently small. We can then use V
N
t as an approximate value function for the
look-ahead policy of Section 2.3.4, and also as a basis for constructing dual-feasible penalties
in Section 2.4.
The following lemma compares the set of feasible policies for the exact tax basis LUL
problem to those for the no-tax problem.
Lemma 2.2.1. The set of feasible policies for the exact tax-basis LUL problem is a subset
of the set of feasible policies for the no-tax problem. Therefore, V Nt ≥ V LULt .
Proof. Suppose taxes in the LUL problem are not paid to the tax authority; instead they
are invested in a special risk-free security that also earns the same risk-free rate r0. The
proceeds of this investment are made available to the agent at maturity T . In this case we
see that any feasible policy for this adjusted exact tax-basis LUL problem is also feasible
for the no-tax problem. In particular the optimal value function for this adjusted problem
V LUL, adjt satisfies V
LUL, adj
t ≤ V Nt . But we clearly have V LULt ≤ V
LUL,adj
t and so the result
follows.
Note that the result in Lemma 2.2.1 does not hold in general for FUL problems.
2.3 Feasible Investment Policies
In this section we discuss several methods for constructing feasible policies for the exact
tax-basis LUL problem that we formulated in Section 2.2. We note that each of these
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policies can be simulated so that it is straightforward to obtain unbiased estimates of their
performances. Given that these policies are feasible, it is clear that these estimates are lower
or primal bounds on the optimal value function, V LUL0 . We begin with policies based on the
solution to the no-tax problem.
2.3.1 Tax-Blind Policies
Under the tax-blind policy, the agent simply re-balances her portfolio in every period so that
her after-tax portfolio agrees with4 the optimal portfolio of the no-tax model. In order to
implement this policy, we first define a sufficiently fine grid of points representing the support
of zt. We then solve the DP (2.2.16) numerically on this grid and obtain the optimal post-
trade asset fractions (b̃t(zt), ñt(zt)), for each time t and each grid value, zt. We only need to
solve the no-tax problem once and then store the solution for future use.
The fractions (b̃t(zt), ñt(zt)) for the realized state zt are computed using linear interpola-
tion. If she needs to sell shares in a certain stock, we assume she does so in equal proportions
from each holding or tax-basis of that security. These trades are transacted under the LUL
assumption so that taxes are paid at each time t if there are net realized capital gains at
that time after offsetting by any accumulated unused losses. Note that trading this way is
more efficient (and therefore more realistic) than assuming the portfolio is liquidated at each
time t before paying any taxes due and then trading to the no-tax solution.
While typically ruled out in practice, it is common in the literature to allow so-called
4We say two portfolios “agree” if they both hold the same fractions of wealth in each security.
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wash-sales where the agent is allowed to sell and immediately repurchase shares in any
stock. This is advantageous for a portfolio with embedded capital losses because the wash
sales transaction realizes the capital losses so they are immediately available for offsetting
any realized gains. We will refer to the tax-blind policy which always avails of wash-sales as
the modified tax-blind policy. Note that we allow wash-sales in the rolling buy-and-hold and
look-ahead policies of Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4.
2.3.2 The Buy-and-Hold Policy
Under the buy-and-hold policy, the investor can trade at time t = 0, but is not allowed to
trade again until time T when her portfolio is liquidated and capital gain taxes, τgT , are



















gT ≥ (pT − p0)′n0,0
gT ≥ 0
where the last two constraints ensure the LUL tax rule is observed.
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2.3.3 The Rolling Buy-and-Hold Policies
In contrast to the tax-blind policy, the buy-and-hold portfolio is chosen taking taxes into
account but it cannot react to changes in the market conditions by re-balancing the portfolio
during the investment horizon. The rolling buy-and-hold (RBH) policy can partly overcome
these shortcomings. At each time t, the agent following the RBH policy assumes that she
can trade at time t, but subsequently that she will not be allowed to trade again until time




















(pT − pj)′nj,t + lt
gT ≥ 0
where Xt(xt−1,p0:t) denotes the set of feasible trades at time t.
We obtain an unbiased estimate for the value function of the RBH policy by averaging the
performance over I sample paths. Over each path i and each time instant t along the path,
we need to compute the optimal trade by solving (2.3.2). The expectation in the objective
function of (2.3.2) cannot be evaluated analytically so instead we approximate it by taking
samples. In particular, we use low-discrepancy sequences (LDS) and quasi-Monte-Carlo to
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generate M scenarios p
(m)
T ,m = 1, ...,M for the random time T security prices.
5 At time t,






































′nj,t + lt 1 ≤ m ≤ M (2.3.5)
g
(m)
T ≥ 0 1 ≤ m ≤ M (2.3.6)
where τg
(m)
T is the capital gains tax paid after liquidating the portfolio at time T in the
m-th scenario and b
(m)
T is the resulting after-tax cash. The optimization problem (2.3.3) has
2M +K(t+1)+ 3 decision variables and 2M +2 constraints 6. Since the objective function
(2.3.3) is concave and all constraints are linear, (2.3.3) is a convex optimization problem,
and in principle can be solved using standard solvers.7
We need the number of scenarios M for the time T security prices to be large in order to
adequately approximate the expectation in (2.3.2). In the case of 20 risky securities and 20
time periods we chose M = 100, 000 scenarios. MOSEK then required 2.5 minutes8 to solve
5Further details are in Appendix A.1.
6We include the main constraints (2.2.7), (2.2.11), (2.3.4) and (2.3.5) in our constraint count but exclude
the non-negativity constraints (2.2.8)–(2.2.10), (2.2.12), (2.2.13) and (2.3.6) since these latter constraints
have little impact on the solution time. Note that constraints (2.2.7)–(2.2.13) are implicitly present in Xt.
7When γ is rational, (2.3.3) can be reformulated as a second-order cone program [3].
8The computations were done with Matlab using the convex non-linear optimization in MOSEK on a
Windows 7 computer with 3.6GHz Intel i7-4770 4 cores CPU and 16 GB of RAM. We used this computer
for all computations reported in this chapter.
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(2.3.3) for all trading periods on a given sample path. If one uses N = 5, 000 sample paths to
estimate the value of the RBH policy, the total running time is then approximately 9 days!
It is clear we need an alternative approach to solving the approximate RBH problem.










′nj,t + lt, 0
}
. (2.3.7)
























where θ > 0 is a fixed scalar. Note that the function g̃
(m)
T (·) is always non-negative, and is
therefore consistent with the no tax-rebate property of the LUL tax rule. In addition, it is
easy to check that g̃
(m)
T (x) converges to g
(m)
T (x) as θ goes to infinity. Therefore, g̃
(m)
T (·) serves
as a good approximation to g
(m)





T (·) is twofold. First, we have analytical expressions for the first and second
order derivatives of g̃
(m)
T that can be passed to the convex optimization solver. Second, we
can significantly reduce the problem size by expressing b
(m)
T as a function of xt using g̃
(m)
T (xt)



















nj,t − τ g̃(m)T (xt)
)1−γ
(2.3.9)
s.t. xt ∈ Xt(xt−1,p0:t)
where there are now a total of K(t + 1) + 2 variables and only 2 constraints (2.2.7) and
(2.2.11) (implicitly present in Xt(xt−1,p0:t)10. Note that the size of the problem (2.3.9) is
now independent of M .
Let ft(xt) denote the objective function in (2.3.9). We solve it using the following se-
quential quadratic programming (SQP) approach.





2. Approximate ft(xt) with a second order Taylor expansion f̄t(xt) about x̄t, and solve
max
xt
f̄t(xt) := ft(x̄t) +∇ft(x̄t)′(xt − x̄t) +
1
2
(xt − x̄t)′∇2ft(x̄t)(xt − x̄t) (2.3.10)
s.t. xt ∈ Xt(xt−1,p0:t)
where ∇ft(x̄t) and ∇2ft(x̄t) are the gradient vector and Hessian matrix of ft, respec-
tively, evaluated at x̄t. Recall that we have analytical expressions for both ∇ft(x̄t)
and ∇2ft(x̄t). Let xoptt be the optimal solution to (2.3.10).
9We note that the non-linear function g̃
(m)
T (xt) in (2.3.9) implies that the problem (2.3.9) cannot be
formulated as a second-order cone program.
10Again not counting the non-negativity constraints.
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3. Evaluate the objective function ft at x
opt
t , and stop if we have converged to within a
given error tolerance. Otherwise set x̄t = x
opt
t and return to step 2.
We used an absolute error tolerance of 10−5 in our SQP algorithm. Depending on the
level of risk aversion, γ, this corresponds to a relative error tolerance between 10−5 and 10−6.
We typically found that the SQP approach converged after only two or three iterations. The
time required to solve the quadratic programming problem (2.3.10) is significantly smaller
than that required to solve the general convex programming problem (2.3.3). Returning
to our earlier example of 20 stocks and 20 time periods with M = 100, 000 scenarios, the
SQP approach requires approximately 3 seconds to solve all 20 problems on one sample
path11; computing the RBH policy along 5,000 paths to estimate the value function therefore
takes approximately 4 hours. This corresponds to approximately a 98% improvement in the
solution time.
Note that the optimization problem (2.3.1) required for the buy-and-hold policy is a
special case of the RBH problem and so it can be solved using the SQP approach described
here.
2.3.4 Look-Ahead Policies
We also considered an h-step look-ahead policy where the investor selects the time t trades
assuming that she will next trade at time t+ h, and approximates the continuation value at
time t+ h by the no-tax model’s value function V Nt . Thus, the time t trades are computed
11Calculations are done with MOSEK’s QP solver called from Matlab.
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(pt+h − pj)′nj,t + lt (2.3.13)
gt+h ≥ 0. (2.3.14)
Note that we use the terminal utility function V NT in place of V
N
t+h whenever t + h > T .
The time t conditional expectation in (2.3.11) is taken over the stock prices pt+h and state
vector, zt+h, at time t + h. The performance of the h-step look-ahead is clearly a function
of h. In our numerical experiments, we found that taking h = 6 yielded the best results.
We solve for the h-step look-ahead policy using a technique similar to the one we used
to solve for the RBH policy. We approximate the conditional expectation in (2.3.11) using
M scenarios for the vector of stock prices p
(m)
t+h and state vector z
(m)
t+h conditional on the
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′nj,t + lt 1 ≤ m ≤ M (2.3.17)
g
(m)
t+h ≥ 0 1 ≤ m ≤ M (2.3.18)
where we use the fact that V N(w, z) = 1
1−γw
(1−γ)ϕ(z) (see (2.2.15)). Recall that we pre-
compute the function ϕt+h(·) on a grid in advance and then use linear interpolation to
evaluate ϕt+h(z) for values of z that are not on the grid. The optimization problem (2.3.15)
has the same structure as the optimization problem (2.3.3) for rolling RBH policy and so we
can employ the same smoothing techniques and SQP approach to solve it efficiently.
2.4 Evaluating Sub-Optimal Policies
The performance of any feasible policy for the exact tax-basis LUL problem in (2.2.5) is
clearly a lower bound on the optimal value function V LUL0 . However, since V
LUL
0 is not
computable, we cannot assess the quality of any feasible policy. We can overcome this by
computing valid upper bounds for the value function. We showed in Section 2.2 that the
no-tax value function V N is an upper bound for V LUL; however, this bound is typically
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very weak, and therefore provides relatively little information about the quality of the sub-
optimal feasible policies. In this section we show how to construct tighter upper (or dual)
bounds using the recently developed information relaxations approach of Rogers [60], and in
particular, BSS [16].
2.4.1 Dual Problem Formulation
Let p := [p′0 ... p
′
T ]
′, z := [z′0 ... z
′
T ]
′ and x := [x′0 ... x
′
T ]
′ denote the entire sequence of
security prices, market states and trade decision vectors, respectively. A trading policy can
be interpreted as a function x(p, z) that maps sequences of prices p and market states z
to a sequence of trading decisions x. A feasible trading policy is one where each individual
decision xt is in the set of feasible trades, Xt. A feasible adapted policy is a feasible policy
that is Ft-adapted. Let X L denote the set of all feasible adapted policies for the exact tax-
basis problem. The agent wants to compute a feasible adapted policy that maximizes the
expected utility of the after-tax terminal wealth. Thus, the optimization problem (2.2.5) can
be reformulated as









We will call a function π(x) a dual feasible penalty if E0[π(x(p, z))] ≤ 0 for all feasible
Ft-adapted policies, x(p, z) ∈ X L. It is then clear that











Suppose at time t = 0 the investor has perfect information of all future security prices and
market states before she makes any trading decisions. It then follows that



















where X denotes the set of feasible trades under the assumption of perfect information.
BSS [16] and Rogers [60] establish that strong duality holds in (2.4.2), i.e. there exists dual-
feasible penalties for which Vup = V
LUL
0 . We defer the discussion of our particular choice for
the dual penalty π(x) until Section 2.4.2; we only note at this point that we will only ever
need to consider penalties that are linear in the actions x.
The dual bound of (2.4.2) leads itself to estimation via Monte-Carlo simulation: we
simply simulate I sample paths of the security prices and market states, and on each path
we solve the maximization problem inside the expectation in (2.4.2). If V
(i)
up is the optimal




up /I is an unbiased estimate of Vup.
Moreover, we can estimate Vup to any desired accuracy by choosing a large enough number
of paths, I.
Suppose now we have simulated one sample path for the security prices and state vari-
ables. The inner maximization problem in (2.4.2) is a deterministic optimization problem.
Since b(1−γ)/(1− γ) is concave and we only consider dual penalties π(x) that are linear in x,
the inner problem is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints. Moreover, we
can significantly reduce the number of constraints in (2.2.9) via the variable transformation
n̂j,t := nj,t−1 − nj,t so that n̂j,t denotes the number of shares with tax basis pj sold at time
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t. The inner maximization problem (2.4.2) then takes the form
max









tnt,t + τgt = bt−1r0 +
t−1∑
j=0




n̂t,j = 0 t ≥ 0
gt + lt =
t−1∑
j=0
(pt − pj)′n̂j,t + lt−1 t ≥ 1
nt,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 0
n̂j,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 1, j < t
bt ≥ 0 t ≥ 0
gt ≥ 0 t ≥ 1
lt ≤ 0, l0 = 1, t ≥ 1.
Note that there are (T + 1)(KT + 2K + 2)/2 + 2T + 1 variables and T (K + 2) + 1 con-
straints in this dual inner problem. Moreover, the constraints in the optimization problem
(2.4.3) are quite sparse; only a small subset of the decision variables appears in each of the
constraints, and the objective function in (2.4.3) is separable. Most convex optimization
algorithms, including the MOSEK non-linear convex optimization solver that we used, can
take advantage of these two properties.
For our 20 stock and 20 time period example, each dual problem instance has 4, 682
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decision variables and 441 constraints, and it can be solved in less than 0.03 seconds. Given
that the dual problem size only grows quadratically in K and T , we can easily solve dual
problem instances with a much larger number of securities and time periods. This is per-
haps a surprising observation given the reputation of the (primal) tax-problem for being an
extremely challenging problem to solve.
2.4.2 Dual Penalties
For our LUL exact tax-basis problem we consider a gradient penalty of the form originally
proposed by Brown and Smith [15]. Recall that we use X L to denote the set of feasible
adapted policies for the exact tax-basis LUL problem. We also let XN denote the set of
feasible adapted policies for the no-tax problem. Given a sample path of security prices p
and market states z, let x̃∗(p, z) denote the optimal feasible adapted trading policy for the
no-tax problem, and let w̃T (x̃
∗(p, z)) denote the corresponding terminal wealth that results
from following this policy. We define our gradient penalty as follows.
π(x) := ∇xU(w̃T (x̃∗(p, z)))′(x− x̃∗(p, z)) (2.4.5)
where ∇xU(w̃T (x)) denotes the gradient of the terminal utility with respect to x. Note that
π(x) is clearly linear in the decision vector x.
Since we can view the no-tax problem of (2.2.15) as a static convex optimization problem
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over the trading policy x, the first order conditions imply that
E
[
∇xU(w̃T (x̃∗(p, z)))′(x− x̃∗(p, z))
]
≤ 0 (2.4.6)
for any feasible adapted trading policy x ∈ XN . From Lemma 2.2.1 it follows that X L ⊆ XN
so that (2.4.6) also holds for all x ∈ X L. Thus, the gradient penalty (2.4.5) is dual feasible
for the exact tax-basis LUL problem.
2.5 Numerical Experiments
We consider a stylized exact tax-basis LUL problem where the investor can invest in 20 risky
securities as well as the cash account over a time horizon of T = 20 periods corresponding to
a horizon of 20 years. Without loss of generality we assume an initial wealth of w0 = 1, and
we set tax rates of τ = 20%, 30% and 40%. We consider coefficients of relative risk aversion
γ ∈ {1.5, 3, 5}. In Appendix A.3.4 we report numerical results for the LUL average-cost tax
basis problem.
2.5.1 Security Price and Market State Dynamics
We assume r0 = 1.01 so that the net annual after-tax risk-free rate is 1%. Following
Lynch [52], we define the returns and market state variable dynamics as follows.
ln rt+1 = α+ βzt + ϵ̃t+1 (2.5.1)
zt+1 = λzt + η̃t+1 (2.5.2)
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where rt+1 denotes the return vector for the risky securities over the period [t, t+1] and ϵt are
IID multivariate normal random vectors with mean 0 and covariance Σϵ. The parameters α
and Σϵ are chosen so that all securities have a Sharp ratio of 0.2, and the expected annual
returns are uniformly distributed between 2% and 10%. We assume security returns are
equi-correlated with a correlation coefficient of either ρ = 0.4 or ρ = 0.9.
We assume zt is 1-dimensional and without loss of generality, we assume that it has unit
variance. The market-state-sensitivity parameter β is then in units of standard deviation
of zt. We set β in such a way that a value of zt = 1 increases the annual expected return
on each stock by 30%, e.g. from 10% per year to 13%. The random variable ηt in (2.5.2) is
assumed to be IID Normal with mean 0 and variance σ2η = 1− λ2. We set λ = 0.6.
2.5.2 Results
We simulated I = 5, 000 sample paths and implemented all policies described in Section 2.3
on each sample path. The dual problem was also solved on the same 5,000 paths.
Let ū denote the average utility of a feasible policy, or a dual bound on the optimal value.
Since ū is difficult to interpret, we instead report the annualized certainty equivalent return,
CE(ū), in our numerical results. CE(ū) is defined as the constant annualized return, rce,

















We report the mean and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for the CE(ū).
We used the realized utility of the no-tax model as a control variate in order to reduce
the number of Monte-Carlo paths that we required for estimating accurate primal and dual




















where I is the number of Monte-Carlo paths, p(i) and z(i) are the sequences of security prices
and market states on the i-th path, x(p(i), z(i)) is the sequence of decisions made by the
sub-optimal policy under consideration, x̃(p(i), z(i)) is the optimal feasible adapted trading
policy for the no-tax problem and V N0 is the optimal expected utility for the no-tax problem.
Our experimental results are displayed in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 corresponding to values
of τ = 20%, 30% and 40%, respectively. The estimated CE returns for the tax-blind, modified
tax-blind, buy-and-hold, RBH and h-step look-ahead policies are denoted by V tb, V mth, V bh,
V rbh and V hl, respectively. In the case of the h-step look-ahead policy we chose a value of
h = 6. The dual bound, V gd , was obtained using the gradient penalty in (2.4.5) while V
N
0
is the CE return of the no-tax problem and, as explained earlier, is also an upper bound on
the true optimal CE return.
We note that the best primal bounds are obtained from the h-period look-ahead policy
which outperforms the RBH policy by 1 to 5 basis-points per annum. The RBH policy is
the second best of the policies under consideration and outperforms the other policies by
as much as 15 basis points per annum or as little as 1 or 2 basis points. The modified
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Table 2.1: Results for exact tax-basis LUL problem with tax rate τ = 20%
Parameters Sub-Optimal Policies Upper Bounds
γ ρ (%) V tb V mtb V bh V rbh V hl V gd V
N
0
1.5 0.4 CE return 3.33 3.41 3.23 3.42 3.47 3.64 4.01
95% C.I (3.33, 3.34) (3.41, 3.41) (3.20, 3.27) (3.40, 3.44) (3.44, 3.48) (3.63, 3.64)
1.5 0.9 CE return 2.09 2.11 2.07 2.16 2.20 2.31 2.58
95% C.I (2.08, 2.09) (2.11, 2.12) (2.05, 2.09) (2.15, 2.18) (2.18, 2.21) (2.31, 2.31)
3 0.4 CE return 2.23 2.26 2.11 2.26 2.29 2.41 2.61
95% C.I (2.23, 2.24) (2.26, 2.26) (2.09, 2.15) (2.24, 2.28) (2.28, 2.31) (2.41, 2.42)
3 0.9 CE return 1.55 1.56 1.51 1.59 1.61 1.70 1.84
95% C.I (1.55, 1.55) (1.56, 1.56) (1.49, 1.52) (1.58, 1.60) (1.60, 1.61) (1.70, 1.70)
5 0.4 CE return 1.68 1.72 1.63 1.72 1.74 1.82 1.94
95% C.I (1.68, 1.69) (1.72, 1.72) (1.61, 1.64) (1.71, 1.73) (1.73, 1.75) (1.82, 1.82)
5 0.9 CE return 1.33 1.34 1.29 1.35 1.36 1.44 1.54
95% C.I (1.33, 1.34) (1.34, 1.34) (1.28, 1.31) (1.34, 1.35) (1.36, 1.37) (1.44, 1.44)
tax-blind policy in particular is comparable to the RBH policy when τ is just 20%. This
is not surprising since we know that the tax-blind policies are optimal in the limit as τ
goes to zero. It may be surprising that our best policy, i.e. the h-period look-ahead policy,
only outperforms the tax-blind and buy-and-hold policies by 6 to 36 basis points per annum
with the actual number depending on γ and τ . However, this can be explained by the fact
that even these latter policies are optimal within their class, and therefore, expected to still
perform reasonably well.
Turning to the dual bounds, we note that in all cases V gd is significantly superior to the
no-tax bound, V N0 . In fact the duality gap, i.e. the difference between the estimated best
CE return (corresponding to the h-period lookahead policy) and V gd , ranges from just 8 to
22 basis points per annum. If the true optimal CE is approximately at the midpoint of
the duality gap, we could conclude that the h-step look-ahead policy is only 4 to 11 basis
points per annum from the optimal CE return, at least for the numerical experiments we
have considered here.
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Table 2.2: Results for exact tax-basis LUL problem with tax rate τ = 30%
Parameters Sub-Optimal Policies Upper Bounds
γ ρ (%) V tb V mtb V bh V rbh V hl V gd V
N
0
1.5 0.4 CE return 2.96 3.10 2.99 3.17 3.21 3.43 4.01
95% C.I (2.96, 2.97) (3.10, 3.11) (2.95, 3.02) (3.14, 3.19) (3.18, 3.22) (3.42, 3.44)
1.5 0.9 CE return 1.82 1.84 1.89 2.00 2.02 2.19 2.58
95% C.I (1.82, 1.83) (1.83, 1.84) (1.87, 1.92) (1.98, 2.01) (2.00, 2.03) (2.19, 2.19)
3 0.4 CE return 2.03 2.09 1.98 2.12 2.15 2.31 2.61
95% C.I (2.03, 2.04) (2.09, 2.10) (2.95, 2.01) (2.10, 2.14) (2.13, 2.17) (2.30, 2.32)
3 0.9 CE return 1.41 1.42 1.42 1.49 1.51 1.63 1.84
95% C.I (1.41, 1.41) (1.42, 1.42) (1.41, 1.44) (1.48, 1.50) (1.50, 1.52) (1.63, 1.63)
5 0.4 CE return 1.58 1.60 1.55 1.62 1.65 1.76 1.94
95% C.I (1.57, 1.58) (1.60, 1.61) (1.53, 1.56) (1.60, 1.64) (1.63, 1.66) (1.75, 1.76)
5 0.9 CE return 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.29 1.31 1.40 1.54
95% C.I (1.23, 1.23) (1.24, 1.24) (1.23, 1.25) (1.29, 1.30) (1.30, 1.31) (1.40, 1.40)
Table 2.3: Results for exact tax-basis LUL problem with tax rate τ = 40%
Parameters Sub-Optimal Policies Upper Bounds
γ ρ (%) V tb V mtb V bh V rbh V hl V gd V
N
0
1.5 0.4 CE return 2.58 2.75 2.72 2.90 2.94 3.21 4.01
95% C.I (2.58, 2.59) (2.75, 2.76) (2.68, 2.75) (2.88 2.92) (2.92, 2.96) (3.21, 3.22)
1.5 0.9 CE return 1.55 1.57 1.72 1.83 1.84 2.05 2.58
95% C.I (1.54, 1.55) (1.56, 1.57) (1.70, 1.75) (1.81, 1.85) (1.83, 1.85) (2.05, 2.05)
3 0.4 CE return 1.80 1.89 1.84 1.97 2.00 2.18 2.61
95% C.I (1.80, 1.81) (1.89, 1.89) (1.81, 1.86) (1.95, 1.99) (1.99, 2.01) (2.18, 2.18)
3 0.9 CE return 1.25 1.26 1.33 1.39 1.41 1.56 1.84
95% C.I (1.24, 1.25) (1.25, 1.26) (1.32, 1.35) (1.38, 1.40) (1.40, 1.41) (1.56, 1.56)
5 0.4 CE return 1.43 1.48 1.47 1.54 1.57 1.68 1.94
95% C.I (1.42, 1.43) (1.47, 1.48) (1.46, 1.49) (1.53, 1.56) (1.55, 1.58) (1.68, 1.69)
5 0.9 CE return 1.13 1.14 1.19 1.24 1.25 1.35 1.54
95% C.I (1.13, 1.13) (1.14, 1.14) (1.18, 1.20) (1.23, 1.25) (1.24, 1.25) (1.35, 1.35)
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2.6 Conclusions and Further Research
In this chapter we have considered the challenging problem of tax-aware dynamic portfolio
allocation. We have developed several sub-optimal trading policies for the exact tax-basis
LUL problems and constructed lower and upper bounds on the certainty equivalent returns
of these policies. It is clear that similar policies can also be constructed for other variations
of these tax problems. Our principal contribution has been to demonstrate that much larger
problems than previously considered can now be tackled through the use of sophisticated
optimization techniques and duality methods based on information-relaxations. Moreover,
the dual formulations of exact tax-basis problems are much easier to solve than the corre-
sponding primal problems and it is quite straightforward to solve dual problems where the
number of securities and time periods is much larger than in the problems we considered
in Section 2.5. To the best of our knowledge we are also the first to successfully use these
duality methods for tax-aware asset allocation. We also consider the relatively easier average
tax-basis problem in Appendix A.3 and A.4 but note that dual problem instances in this
case are non-convex. We propose solution approaches for these problem instances so that
we can still obtain valid upper bounds.
There are several possible directions for future research. First, we would like to identify
better primal policies. We believe that it will be possible to leverage recent work on sub-
optimal control and approximate dynamic programming to construct near optimal policies.
A second direction is to improve our understanding of the (approximately) optimal trading
policies for these problems. In particular, when do these policies trade? Is there an easy-to-
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characterize no-trade zone? How do the answers to these questions depend on the particular
version of the tax problem that we are addressing?
A third direction concerns portfolio allocation problems with the average tax-basis. While
the primal version of this problem is significantly easier (albeit still challenging) when com-
pared to the exact tax-basis problems, the corresponding dual problem are non-convex, and
therefore, very difficult to solve. We have outlined in Appendix A.3 an approaches for con-
structing valid bounds. We successfully tested one of these approaches using the BARON solver
but further experimentation will be required before we can definitively conclude that this
approach is viable for all average-cost tax basis dual problems.
In addition, there are other tax-related problems, e.g. tax-aware index tracking, that
could also be solved using the approach outlined in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Portfolio Execution with
Transaction Cost
3.1 Introduction
We study a dynamic portfolio execution problem which incorporates risk aversion, stochastic
return covariances, and temporary and permanent linear price impacts that are also stochas-
tic and time-varying. We propose a variant of an open-loop feedback control (OLFC) policy
for solving the resulting portfolio execution problem and use duality methods based on infor-
mation relaxations to demonstrate how well this policy performs, at least for the parameter
settings that we consider. We also show that it is straightforward to include a non-linear
temporary price impact as well as return predictability. Our model therefore allows us to
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capture a much broader range of market features than can be captured by those models that
insist on explicit calculation of the optimal policy.
In order to apply the aforementioned duality methods it is necessary to use an approx-
imate value function to compute so-called penalties which penalize the decision-maker for
violating the non-anticipativity constraints. These penalties, however, require us to com-
pute conditional expectations of the approximate value function. Ideally we can compute
these expectations analytically but in many circumstances this may not be possible. This
does not limit the applicability of the dual methodology, however, since it is known that
being able to compute an unbiased estimate of the conditional expectations is sufficient for
computing valid dual bounds. We study the use of suitably randomized low-discrepancy
sequences (LDS) to estimate these expectations efficiently, and show that using randomized
LDS to estimate these expectations can still yield tight dual bounds and at only a very
modest increase (approx 10%) in computational work.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. We define the basic portfolio
execution problem and describe our model in Section 3.2. We also describe there the sub-
optimal policies that we will consider, focusing in particular on a variant of an OLFC policy.
In Section 3.3 we show how the duality theory of BSS [16] can be applied in the context
of our portfolio execution problem. We present numerical results in Section 3.4 where we
consider a portfolio of 50 stocks and 78 time periods, representing, as stated earlier, a trading
frequency of once every 5 minutes. In Section 3.5 we consider how the dual methodology
can be extended to other portfolio execution problems including the problem where there
43
is also a non-linear temporary price impact. We also include numerical results comparing
the performance of the dual bound when the penalties are computed analytically with the
performance when the dual penalties are computed via an unbiased Monte-Carlo simulation.
We conclude in Section 3.6. Appendix B.1 contains the various calculations and derivations
required for implementing the OLFC and other policies. Appendix B.2 analyzes the partic-
ular dual problem arising from our portfolio execution application. Appendix B.4 contains
additional calibration details for the numerical results of Section 3.4.
In Appendix B.3 we consider the model of Bertsimas, Hummel and Lo [10] (BHL) who
considered the problem of an agent needing to purchase shares in multiple securities as-
suming a linear temporary price impact and return predictability. The presence of no-sales
constraints, which in general are binding due to return predictability, implies that it is hard
to solve for optimal policy even numerically. They proposed instead an OLFC policy and
conjectured that such a policy should be close to optimal. Using their calibrated model
parameters, we use the duality techniques to confirm that the OLFC policy is indeed very
close to optimal. While this appendix is stand-alone we include it for two reasons: (i) it
provides another set of numerical experiments (in a portfolio execution context) demonstrat-
ing the use of dual methods to confirm the conjecture that a sub-optimal policy is close to
optimal and (ii) it provides a simple demonstration of how duality can be used to deter-
mine in advance whether or not a particular feature, in this case cross-price impacts, are
worth accounting for in a portfolio execution policy. We believe the duality methodology is
particularly suited for answering such need-to-model questions.
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3.2 The Portfolio Execution Problem and Model De-
scription
We now describe the basic portfolio execution problem of a possibly risk-averse agent who
we assume needs to purchase a fixed number of shares in a fixed number of assets. We note
that we could just as easily handle the problem where the agent needs to sell a portfolio of
securities as well as the case where the agents needs to purchase one subset of securities and
sell another subset.
We assume time is discrete and runs from t = 0 to t = T for a total of T +1 time periods.
There are n different assets that are traded in the market and the agent needs to purchase
a fixed number of shares in each of the n assets between t = 0 and t = T . At time t the
agent observes the non-impact asset price vector p̃t = [p̃
(1)
t . . . p̃
(n)
t ]
′, and then determines
the decision vector, st = [s
(1)





t is the number of shares of the i-th asset
purchased at time t. We will also use su:v to denote the n(v − u + 1)× 1 vector of decision
variables, [s′u . . . s
′
v]
′. However, we will simply write s for s0:T . We use pt = [p
(1)




to denote the time t vector of transaction prices and note that in general, pt ̸= p̃t due to
the market impact of trading. We let wt = [w
(1)





t denotes the remaining
number of shares in asset i that must be purchased in periods t, . . . , T . We define the




tst, and the benchmark cost,
p̃′0w0, which would prevail if the agent could purchase everything at time t = 0 without any
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market impact. The execution cost is therefore given by
T∑
t=0
p′tst − p̃′0w0. (3.2.1)
In order to model risk-aversion we assume that the agent has an exponential utility
function, with parameter γ. We assume that γ > 0 to reflect the fact that we are defining
utility over costs rather than wealth as is usually the case in portfolio optimization problems.













s.t. price and state variable dynamics
T∑
t=0
st = w0 (3.2.3)
and any other constraints (3.2.4)
where we use {Ft}t=0,...,T to denote the filtration generated by the price vectors as well as
any other state variables in the model. Note also that the objective function (3.2.2) does not
include p̃′0w0 because it is a constant and therefore can be factored out. Several comments
are in order:
(i) Risk-neutrality can easily be modeled by taking the limit in (3.2.2) as γ goes to 0.
(ii) Recall the CARA property of exponential utility which, in the context of a standard
dynamic portfolio optimization problem, implies that the optimal dollar value invest-
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ed in risky assets does not depend on the current level of wealth. This property is
typically viewed as a serious weakness of exponential utility. We see no problem with
this assumption in the context of portfolio execution problems, however, because such
problems often have a time horizon of just a few hours or at most just a few days.
(iii) Notwithstanding the previous point, we only use exponential utility as a mechanism
for trading off execution cost with execution risk. In particular, other utility functions
could also be used although the solution approach of Appendices B.1.3 and B.1.4 would
no longer be applicable.
3.2.1 Basic Model Description
Our main model allows for stochastic and time-varying price impacts as well as stochastic
variance-covariance return dynamics. These are important features in practice but are gener-
ally ignored in the academic literature. While we suspect that superior or more sophisticated
proprietary models may be used by some industry participants, our model is sufficiently rich
to demonstrate the broad applicability of the dual methodology as outlined in Section 3.3.
We assume the non-impact price, p̃t, follows a random walk where the dollar return, rt+1,
between times t and t + 1, is normally distributed with mean 0 and conditional covariance
matrix, Σt. A trading volume of st incurs a permanent price impact of Atst and a temporary
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price impact of Btst. This results in dynamics of the form
pt = p̃t +Atst +Btst (3.2.5)




wt+1 = wt − st (3.2.8)
for t = 0, . . . , T and with the understanding that wT+1 = 0. The ϵt’s in (3.2.7) are IID
standard normal random vectors.
In general we allow Σt, At and Bt to be stochastic. This will allow us to model the
tendency for markets to be more liquid around the open and close and less liquid in between.
The assumption of a linear permanent price impact is commonly made in the academic
literature where it has been justified by no-arbitrage considerations; see Huberman and
Stanzl [44] and Gatheral [36]. Nonetheless we note that permanent price impact is generally
assumed to be better approximated by a square-root function in practice. We note that
Guéant [39] recently provided a justification for this without introducing arbitrage into the
model. Later in Section 3.5 we will show that a non-linear temporary price impact can also
be included in our model.
When the agent chooses st at time t, we assume that he knows At, Bt, Σt and p̃t. We
note that it would also be straightforward to model the possibly more realistic situation
where the agent is not assumed to know p̃t when choosing st. We will also assume that we
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can compute Et[Aj] and Et[Bj] for all j ≥ t. In Section 3.4 we will describe the specific
dynamics for Σt, At and Bt that we used in our numerical experiments.
In practical applications the agent may also need to include various types of portfolio
constraints including no-sales constraints
st ≥ 0 for t = 0, ..., T (3.2.9)
as well as sector-balance constraints. These constraints are linear and therefore, as we shall
see later, do not impact the convexity of the primal or dual problems that we consider. We
do not consider portfolio balance constraints but note that it is generally straightforward to
include them when attempting to construct good sub-optimal policies. We also note that
the assumption of a risk-averse utility function implicitly incorporates some form of portfolio
balance constraints.
3.2.2 Sub-Optimal Execution Policies
In general it is not possible to find the optimal policy for this portfolio execution problem
and so instead we seek good sub-optimal policies. For the particular model of Section 3.2.1
we will consider three different policies:
The Simple Policy: Here the agent buys the same quantity of shares in each of the
T + 1 time periods so that st = w0/(T + 1).
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The Risk-Neutral Policy: In this case the agent ignores the risk of the execution costs
and uses the trading policy which minimizes the expected execution cost. If the dynamics of
At and Bt are sufficiently tractable then this trading policy can be determined via dynamic
programming when there are no portfolio constraints. The details are in Appendix B.1.1.
In Appendix B.1.2 we also show that the simple and risk-neutral policies coincide if At and
Bt are martingales and if At and Bt are symmetric. We note that this condition is of course
very unlikely to hold in practice.
The OLFC Policy: At each time t the agent assumes that Σt will remain constant
thereafter in which case he assumes the return series, {rj}Tj=t+1, is IID MVN(0,Σt). The
agent also assumes the price impact matrices evolve deterministically and replaces Aj and
Bj with their time-t conditional expectations, Et[Aj] and Et[Bj], respectively, for j ≥ t. The













s.t. pj = p̃j + Et[Aj]sj + Et[Bj]sj for j = t, . . . , T
p̃j+1 = p̃j + rj+1 + Et[Aj]sj for j = t, . . . , T
rj = Σ
1/2




sj ≥ 0. for j = t, . . . , T
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corresponding optimal solution. The OLFC policy implements sol,tt at time t and ignores
sol,tt+1, . . . , s
ol,t
T . Further details on solving this problem are in Appendix B.1.3. We also note
that if we remove the constraint sj ≥ 0, then an analytic solution to the OLFC policy can
be found very quickly via dynamic programming. This analytic solution will form the basis
for constructing dual penalties as discussed in Section 3.3. Details on this solution can be
found in Appendix B.1.4.
A Risk-Neutral OLFC Policy: As mentioned above, depending on the dynamics of
At and Bt, the Risk-Neutral policy may not be computable. In this case we can compute
the risk-neutral OLFC policy by taking the limit of (3.2.10) as γ goes to 0. The details are
in Appendix B.1.3.
3.3 Evaluating Sub-Optimal Policies
Given a feasible suboptimal policy to the portfolio execution problem in (3.2.2), we can
construct an unbiased upper bound, Vub, to the optimal value function, V
∗, by simulating
multiple paths of the policy and taking the sample average of the realized utility. We can also
use dual methods to estimate a lower bound, Vlb. Appendix C contains a review of these dual
methods that were originally developed independently by BSS [16] and Rogers [60]. In this
section we state the dual problem formulation of (3.2.2) and briefly discuss the tractability of
this dual problem and its implications for modeling various features of the portfolio execution
problem.
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Let Ṽt(s0:t−1) be some approximation to the time t optimal value function of the port-
folio execution problem. While we typically consider a value function to be a function of
the model’s state variables, in our duality context it is much more convenient to explicitly





















yields a lower bound on V ∗ where S is the decision space defined by constraints (3.2.3) and
(3.2.4). Moreover, strong duality states that if we take Ṽ = V ∗ then Vlb = V
∗. This suggests
that the closer Ṽt(s0:t−1) is to the optimal value function the tighter the dual bound will be.
Note that it is the shape of Ṽ that is important rather than the absolute level of Ṽ because
adding any constant to Ṽ will have no impact on the dual bound as it will cancel out on the
right-hand-side of (3.3.1). In general for a given Ṽt we cannot compute Vlb in closed form
but in principle, an unbiased estimate of it can be computed via Monte-Carlo: we simply
simulate M paths of the exogenously specified noise processes and on each path we solve the
minimization problem inside the expectation in (3.3.1). If V
(i)
lb is the optimal solution of the




lb /M is an unbiased estimate of Vlb.
Two key issues arise in applying the duality methodology. First, while V
(i)
lb can be
obtained as the solution of a deterministic dynamic program, solving this DP may, like
the primal problem, also be difficult. Instead we prefer to solve it as a static optimization
problem but to do this we would generally prefer this optimization problem to be convex.
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is convex in s there is no guarantee that the objective







can overcome this problem, however, by using an approximation Ṽt+1 that is linear in st.
It is important to note that using such an approximation still yields a valid dual bound.
This approach was introduced by Brown and Smith [15] and further details are provided in
Section 3.3.1 below.
The second issue that arises is the possibility of not being able to compute an analytic
expression for Et[Ṽt+1(s0:t)]. Note that these conditional expectations are required to evaluate
the objective function inside the expectation in (3.3.1). As discussed in Section 3.3.1 below,
with our choice of Ṽt, we were able to compute these conditional expectations analytically.
We will also see in Section 3.5, however, that even if we cannot compute these expectations
in closed form then we can instead use unbiased estimates of them and still obtain valid
dual bounds. In a series of numerical experiments we will see that the resulting dual bounds
remain very tight and that they are not much more expensive to compute than the bounds
we obtain when the conditional expectations are available in closed form. We conclude then
that the second issue can also often be overcome.
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3.3.1 The Dual Problem Formulation
Under the model assumptions of Section 3.2.1, we see from (3.3.1) that a dual problem

















s.t. pt = p̃t +Atst +Btst
p̃t+1 = p̃t + rt+1 +Atst
where the rt’s, At’s and Bt’s have been simulated according to the true model dynamics and
are all known to the decision-maker, and S denotes the constraint region defined by (3.2.3)
and (3.2.9). We would like to take Ṽt to be a linearized version of V
ol
t as we expect that
the OLFC policy will typically provide a good approximation to V ∗t . In this case, however,
it is difficult to compute Et[Ṽt+1(s0:t)]. While we can overcome this problem using nested
Monte-Carlos as discussed in Section 3.5, we prefer instead to use a modified version of V olt
which we denote by V molt . The precise definition of V
mol
t can be found in Appendix B.2.2
but we note in particular that we can compute an analytic expression for Et[V molt+1 (s0:t)].





























where we have used (B.2-6) to substitute for V molt+1 in (3.3.3) and then used (3.2.6) to obtain
(3.3.4). We note that the dependence of V̂t+1(·) on s0:t also appears via wt+1 since wt+1 =
w0 −
∑t
j=0 sj. Note also that we want to include the first term on the right-hand side
of (3.3.3) as this term is present in the value function (see also the remark at the end of
Appendix C) of any policy but we omitted it from (3.2.10) as it had no impact on the OLFC
policy at time t+ 1.
The difficulty with taking Ṽt+1(s0:t) = V̂t+1(s0:t) as given by (3.3.4) is that the resulting
objective function in (3.3.2) will not in general be convex, even if the first term in (3.3.2)
is convex. Instead we linearize V̂t+1. Recall that s0:t = [s
′
0 . . . s
′
t]
′ denotes the n(t + 1) × 1
vector of decision variables corresponding to the first t + 1 time periods and let s̃0:t be a
fixed n(t+1)× 1 vector. We then take Ṽt+1(·) to be a first order Taylor expansion of V̂t+1(·)
about s̃0:t. In particular, we take
Ṽt+1(s0:t) := V̂t+1(s̃0:t) +∇V̂t+1(s̃0:t)′(s0:t − s̃0:t) (3.3.5)
and then use this in (3.3.2), noting that the linearity of Ṽt+1 in s0:t will preserve convexity
of the objective function in (3.3.2) if the exponential term there is itself convex.
The question that now arises is how to choose s̃0:t? Intuitively we would like s̃0:t to be
as close as possible to the true optimal trade sequence. But of course we don’t know the
optimal trade sequence, so instead we will take s̃0:t = [s
ol,0 ′
0 . . . s
ol,t ′
t ]
′, the trade sequence from
the unconstrained OLFC policy. This implies that s̃0:t is path-dependent so that each dual
problem instance will use a different s̃0:t to construct the Ṽt+1. This requires no additional
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work, however, since the sol,tt ’s will have already been computed when simulating the OLFC
policy.
In order to compute Et[Ṽt+1(s0:t)] = Et[V̂t+1(s̃0:t)] + Et[∇V̂t+1(s̃0:t)′](s0:t − s̃0:t) we need






















where w̃t+1 = w0 −
∑t
j=0 s̃j. The first exponential term on the right-hand-side of (3.3.6)
is Ft-measurable (since the OLFC policy is Ft-adapted and G̃t+1 is Ft-measurable) and
conditional on Ft, rt+1 is normally distributed with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σt. We
can therefore compute Et[V̂t+1(s̃0:t)] analytically and, while the calculations are somewhat
tedious, we can also do the same for Et[∇V̂t+1(s̃0:t)′]. This means in particular that we can
compute an analytic expression for the dual penalty term, Et[Ṽt+1(s0:t)]− Ṽt+1(s0:t).
3.3.2 Dual Convexity
The exponential term in (3.3.2) is studied in Appendix B.2 where we establish sufficient
conditions on the At’s and Bt’s that guarantee its convexity for all dual problem instances.
For example, we show that if At = A, a constant matrix, and that A+A
′ is positive definite
and Bt + B
′
t is positive semi-definite for all t, then every dual problem instance will be
convex. These conditions guarantee the positive definiteness of At + A
′
t + Bt + B
′
t which
seems reasonable from an economic standpoint.
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If the At’s are stochastic, however, then economic considerations may still be employed
to impose some structure on their dynamics. For example, it seems reasonable to assume
that there should always exists a solution to the OLFC problem. Otherwise the OLFC
decision-maker would believe (possibly incorrectly admittedly since he makes simplifying
assumptions on the model dynamics) that arbitrage opportunities exist. This seems very
unlikely in practice and so we could therefore insist on dynamics for the At’s that guarantee
the positive-definiteness of the QOLFC,t’s as defined in (B.1-19) of Appendix B.1.3
More generally, however, it is not clear that we can use economic considerations to justify
the convexity of each dual problem instance when the At’s are stochastic. After all, consider
the example where there is no temporary price impact and the agent needs to purchase
shares in just one security over the course of a day. If the At’s are stochastic it is possible
on some given realization of the model uncertainty over the course of a day, that the price
impact is very large in the early periods and approximately zero in the later periods. In
the corresponding dual problem instance (with zero dual penalties, say) this could result in
arbitrage profits since the agent could drive up the stock price over the course of the day by
purchasing many shares when the price impact is large and then selling them all at the end of
the day when the price impact is small. The presence of such arbitrage-profits would imply
the non-convexity of the corresponding dual problem instance. The primal problem could
still be well-posed, however, since the decision-maker does not get to see the realization of
the day’s uncertainty at time t = 0 and therefore would not be in a position to profit from
the aforementioned strategy.
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In general then, it seems possible for a plausible model to result in some dual problem
instances that are non-convex. In that case we would need to bound the optimal objective
function of these particular dual problems in order to still obtain a valid dual bound. This
should be possible in the presence of portfolio constraints such as no-sales constraints, since
in that case every dual problem would have a compact decision-space and therefore have a
bounded optimal solution. Nonetheless, this would require more work as we would need to
check for convexity of each dual problem and then solve to optimality those problems that
are convex and bound the optimal solution to the non-convex problems. In the numerical
results of Section 3.4, we have limited ourselves to a model specification where convexity of
all problem instances is guaranteed. But we do acknowledge that this appears to be a strong
assumption in models with stochastic price impacts.
3.3.3 Using the Dual Formulation to Investigate More Complex
Models
We mention at this point just how useful the dual methodology can be. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that we begin with a simplified model where the non-impact price, p̃t, follows a
simple random walk. Suppose also that we have established that all of the corresponding
dual problems are convex and therefore very tractable. Consider now adding the following
features to this simplified model: (i) we replace the random walk dynamics with stochastic
variance-covariance dynamics and (ii) we introduce new state variables to model return pre-
dictability. Then the dual problem instances of this more complex model will remain convex
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as long as the stochastic volatility and state variable dynamics are not influenced by the de-
cision variables. This follows immediately once we recognize that these new model features
only affect the distribution of dual problem instances; in particular they do not change the
convexity properties of the dual problem instances. Another way to see this is to consider
the dual problem instance in (3.3.2). We see rt+1 appear in the constraints for this problem
but Σt does not. Similarly, if we had a state vector, Zt, that induced predictability in the
returns, then Zt would also not appear in the dual problem formulation and so it would not
influence the convexity of the dual problems. It would, however, influence the distribution
of the dual problems and therefore the actual value of the dual bound.
Note also that in this more complex model we are free to use the original Ṽt from the
simplified model in order to construct dual penalties and a dual bound. Similarly we are also
free to use a sub-optimal policy for the simplified model to construct a primal bound for the
more complex model. If we then find that the resulting duality gap is small then we know
that the new features (as currently calibrated) have little influence and can be safely ignored.
We would argue then that the dual methodology can also be employed to determine whether
or not certain features, that are known to exist in the market, are sufficiently important as to
require explicit modeling. We do precisely this in Section 3.5.2 where we investigate whether
or not it’s necessary to include a stochastic component in our temporary price impact model.
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3.4 Numerical Results
In this section we analyze the performance of the primal and dual bounds on a stylized
example where the agent needs to purchase 100, 000 shares in each of n = 50 securities over
T + 1 = 78 time periods. The 78 time periods are intended to reflect the fact that there
are 78 five-minute periods in a trading day of 6.5 hours. We note that each dual problem
instance has a total of 50 × 78 = 3, 900 decision variables and that computing the OLFC
policy at each time t involves (T + 1 − t) × 50 decision variables. Of course in practice,
portfolio execution problems can involve several hundred assets and computing good sub-
optimal policies in (almost) real time and evaluating these policies via duality can itself be a
significant challenge. If, for example, a portfolio execution problem has 500 assets then each
dual problem instance will have 500 × 78 = 39, 000 decision variables and solving a large
number of these dual problem instances would therefore be computationally demanding.
We note, however, that there is no need to compute dual bounds in real time as they are
not required to implement a given execution policy. There is therefore no problem with
computing dual bounds off-line.
Returning to our example, we take our 50 stocks to be the top 50 stocks by market
capitalization in the S&P 500 as of October 12 2011. We take the initial price vector, p̃0, to
be the initial prices of these 50 stocks on that date. We consider 10 different values of the
risk aversion parameter: γ = k × 10−7 for k = 1, . . . , 10. For each value of γ, we simulate
5, 000 sample paths and implement the various sub-optimal policies on each sample path.
We use only 100 sample paths to estimate the dual bounds as this smaller number was found
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to estimate the dual bounds with an accuracy comparable to that of the primal bounds.
We also used control variates as a variance reduction technique and the specific details can
be found in Appendix B.1.5. We note that obtaining the primal bound required solving
5, 000 × 78 optimization problems whereas obtaining the dual bound required solving just
100 optimization problems. The computational bottleneck was therefore in estimating the
primal bound.
3.4.1 The Price Impact Dynamics
We assume the price impact coefficients of a stock are inversely proportional to its average
daily trading volume. In particular, we take the permanent price impact coefficient matrix
At = A to be a constant diagonal matrix so that there is no cross price impact. The diagonal
elements ofA are obtained by assuming that the purchase of 10% of the average daily volume
of a stock will incur a permanent price impact of 10 basis points of the stock’s initial price.
In the case of Apple Inc, for example, this implies a permanent price impact coefficient of
1.7830 × 10−7. With an initial price of $407.33, we therefore see that if all 100, 000 shares
are purchased immediately then the permanent price impact will be 1.7830× 10−7 × 105 =
$0.01783 per share.
We assume that the temporary price impact matrix Bt is driven by a single factor, xt,
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according to
Bt = max(xt, 0)B (3.4.1)
xt = xd,t + xs,t (3.4.2)
xs,t = ρxs,t−1 + ηt (3.4.3)
where B is a positive-definite matrix and the max operator in (3.4.1) ensures Bt is positive
semi-definite for all t. The state variable xt is composed of a deterministic component, xd,t,
and a stochastic component, xs,t. The xd,t’s are chosen to reflect the fact that the market
impact tends to be smaller nearer the open and the close of the trading day. We have
assumed xs,t is an AR(1) process so that ηt’s in (3.4.3) are IID normal random variables
with mean 0 and variance σ2η. The AR(1) assumption allows us to capture mean-reverting
and clustering effects so that periods of low (high) liquidity tend to be followed by periods
of low (high) liquidity. We emphasize here, however, that this is a stylized example and in
practice considerably more care would be required to specify the dynamics of Bt.
We assume that B is also a diagonal matrix and represents a temporary price impact
of 50 basis points when xt = 1 and 1% of the average daily volume of a stock is purchased
immediately. Since A and B are both diagonal matrices we have assumed here that there are
no cross-price impacts. We set xs,0 = 0, ρ = 0.6 and σ
2
η = 0.25
2 × (1− ρ2). If we ignore the
max operator in (3.4.1) then these parameter values correspond to a stationary distribution
of Bt where the diagonal elements have a standard deviation equivalent to a temporary price
impact of 12.5 basis points.
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Figure 3.1(a) plots xd,t as a function of t while Figure 3.1(b) shows the expected temporary
price impact of purchasing 1% of the average daily volume shares at time t as a function of
t and expressed in basis points. Because this is a stylized example we simply assumed that
xd,t is a simple quadratic function as this is perhaps the simplest way to model the fact that
the price impact tends to be lower near the open and the close. Of course we could have just
as easily assumed an alternative and possibly more accurate function for xd,t. It is also not
necessary to restrict ourselves to a scalar process, xt, and we expect a higher dimensional
process would be more realistic in practice.











(a) Deterministic Component, xd,t





















(b) Expected Temporary Price Impact
Figure 3.1: (a) The deterministic component xd,t, is assumed to be quadratic in t. (b) The
expected temporary price impact of purchasing 1% of the average daily volume, expressed
in basis points, is identical for each of the n securities. The dashed line is the time-average
temporary price impact.
Returning now to the case of Apple Inc, the purchase of all 100,000 shares at time t = 0
incurs a temporary price impact of 0.5× 8.9150× 10−6× 105 = $0.4458 per share. Therefore
the total execution cost for this trade is approximately (0.01783 + 0.4458) × 100, 000 =
$46, 358. The assumption that A and B are diagonal matrices is made because of the
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difficulty of calibrating cross-price impacts but we do note that in some circumstances it
may be worthwhile accounting for them. Table B.5 in Appendix B.4.2 contains the initial
prices, average daily volume and price impact coefficients that we assumed for the 50 stocks.
Finally we note that dynamics of At and Bt assumed here satisfy conditions (i) and (ii)
of Appendix B.2.1. We are therefore guaranteed that all dual problem instances will be
convex.
3.4.2 Variance-Covariance Dynamics
We assume that Σt follows an O-GARCH model as in Alexander [1] so that
Σt = FΩtF
′ +Υ (3.4.4)
where Ωt is a diagonal matrix, F is a matrix of factor loadings and Υ is a diagonal matrix
of idiosyncratic variances. The diagonal elements in Ωt are assumed to follow independent
GARCH(1,1) processes. Further details on this model and its calibration can be found in
Appendix B.4.1.
3.4.3 Results
In our numerical results we report both the average execution cost of each policy as well
the certainty equivalent (CE) execution cost. Given an average utility, û, calculated as the
average utility across the simulated sample paths, the CE cost is defined as the execution cost
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(in basis points), ce, which yields the same utility with certainty if all shares are purchased
immediately. That is, ce solves
û = exp(γp̃′0w0(1 + ce/10, 000)). (3.4.5)
The CE cost is much easier to interpret than the average utility and so we prefer to report
the former together with the average execution cost. We note of course that the performance
of any given policy is measured by the CE cost and not the average execution cost which we
would naturally expect to increase with the level of risk aversion, γ.
In Figure 3.2 we have plotted the CE costs for the simple, OLFC and risk-neutral OLFC
policies. We have also plotted the CE cost for the dual bound constructed using the penalties
based on the modified OLFC policy as explained in Section 3.3.1. In this case we see that
there is no discernible gap between the OLFC primal bound and the dual bound which implies
that the OLFC policy is actually very close to optimal. For low levels of risk aversion the
simple and risk-neutral OLFC policies lose only around 5 basis points with respect to the
OLFC policy but this number increases (as expected) to approximately 60 basis points as γ
increases.
We have also plotted the average execution cost as a function of γ in Figure 3.3(a).
We see that the risk-neutral OLFC policy has the lowest average cost which is as expected
since the risk-neutral agent only cares about minimizing execution cost and is indifferent to
execution risk. Since the simple policy is deterministic and the risk-neutral OLFC policy
does not depend on γ we see that their expected execution costs do not vary with γ. As
65































Figure 3.2: Certainty equivalent costs
γ increases the agent becomes more risk averse and therefore prefers to buy more shares in
earlier time periods. This results in a higher price impact which is reflected by the higher
average execution cost for the OLFC policy.
In Figure 3.3(b) we have plotted the mean-standard deviation frontier corresponding to
the OLFC policy. As expected, we see that a higher average execution cost is accompanied
by a lower standard deviation. We also see that the simple policy and risk-neutral OLFC
policy have low average execution costs but high standard deviations.
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(a) Average Execution Cost



































(b) Mean-Standard Deviation Frontier
Figure 3.3: Average cost and mean-standard deviation frontier
3.5 Extensions and Other Portfolio Execution Prob-
lems
In this section we briefly describe how our model can be extended to include a non-linear
temporary price impact as well as predictable state variables with linear dynamics. We
also discuss limit-order book models and explain how the dual technology can also handle
these problems. We begin, however, by considering the case where dual penalties cannot be
calculated explicitly. We will see that we can still quickly compute good dual bounds in that
case using Monte-Carlo methods. While this is not a “model extension” it clearly broadens
the range of penalties that can be used when constructing dual bounds.
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3.5.1 Computing Dual Bounds When Penalties Cannot Be Com-
puted Explicitly
We noted in Section 3.3.1 that we needed to compute terms of the form Et[V̂t+1(s̃0:t)] and
Et[∇V̂t+1(s̃0:t)′] in order to solve a given dual problem instance as in (3.3.2). BSS [16] showed
that if we could instead only compute unbiased (conditional on FT ) estimates of these terms
then we would still obtain a valid, albeit more conservative, dual bound. The downside
of this approach is that we require Monte-Carlo simulation to estimate these conditional
expectations and so constructing the dual bound therefore requires nested Monte-Carlo’s
which can be very demanding from a computational standpoint.
In this section we will use suitably randomized low-discrepancy sequences (LDS)1 to
perform the nested simulations and we will compare the resulting dual bound to the dual
bound that we obtained when the conditional expectations are computed in closed form. We
will see that we can compute LDS-based dual bounds that are virtually indistinguishable
from the original dual bounds and that these new bounds only require 10% additional work.
We note that each of the two conditional expectations may be written in the form θ =
E[g(r)] for some function g(·) and where r is an n-dimensional multivariate normal random
vector with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix Σ. The precise form of g(·) is clear from
(3.3.6) in the case of Et[V̂t+1(s̃0:t)] and is also easy to determine in the case of Et[∇V̂t+1(s̃0:t)′].
1See, for example, Chapter 5 of Glasserman [38] for an introduction to LDS and the randomization
technique we describe here.
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Using the inverse-transform approach to Monte-Carlo we can then easily rewrite θ as
θ = E[g(U)] (3.5.1)
where U is an n-dimensional vector of independent U(0, 1) random variables. We could
perform the integration in (3.5.1) using LDS which have very nice theoretical properties
and which often work particularly well for high-dimensional integrals. The problem with
doing this is that the resulting estimate of θ is deterministic and in particular will have
some (although presumably small) bias. As a result we could no longer conclude that our
estimate of Vlb would indeed be an unbiased lower bound. We can overcome this problem
















where (l1, ..., lMl) is a series of n-dimensional low discrepancy points, and (U1, ...,UMu) is
a series of independent n-dimensional uniform random vectors. Note also that the mod-
operator in (3.5.2) applies component-wise and that the inner summation in (3.5.2) uses the
same uniform vector, Uj, for all Ml samples. In practice Mu can be very small, e.g. 5 or
10, whereas Ml might be on the order of 10
4 or higher. That θ̂ is an unbiased estimator for
θ follows from the fact that if Uj is an independent n-dimensional uniform random vector










that θ̂ = 1
Mu
∑Mu
j=1 θ̂j is the mean of Mu IID random variables, and so confidence intervals
can be constructed in the usual way if so desired.
Numerical Results
We considered the same portfolio execution problem that we studied in Section 3.4. In
Figure 3.4 we plot the performance of the dual bound as estimated using our LDS scheme
for various values of Mu, Ml and γ. Our LDS was an n-dimensional Sobol sequence that
we generated using Matlab’s LDS functionality. We skipped the first 1000 points, retained
every 101st point thereafter and also applied the so-called Matousek-Affine-Owen scrambling
scheme.
The dashed lines in Figure 3.4 represent the dual bound that was computed using the
analytic expressions for Et[V̂t+1(s̃0:t)] and Et[∇V̂t+1(s̃0:t)′]. These dashed lines are therefore
the same bounds that we calculated in Section 3.4. As expected, we see that the new LDS-
based dual bounds are conservative so that they are all at or below the corresponding dashed
line. It is also not surprising that as we increase Ml and Mu the bounds improve to the point
that withMl = 10, 000 andMu = 10 the bound is virtually indistinguishable from the dashed
lines. (In fact in a couple of cases, e.g. γ = 7× 10−7 and Mu = 2, the LDS-based bound was
marginally higher than the dashed line but the difference was well within the Monte-Carlo’s
standard error. Recall that even the dashed line has some statistical error as it is computed
as the average over 100 dual problem instances. The LDS-based bounds use the same 100
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dual paths and so these bounds are also exposed to this error as well as the nested simulation
error of (3.5.2).)
The surprising feature of these results is how little additional work is required. For
example, it typically took approximately 150 seconds to solve a dual problem instance when
we used the analytic expressions for the dual penalties. When we used the LDS to estimate
these penalties with Ml = 10, 000 and Mu = 10 the running time increased by approximately
15 seconds for a relative increase of just 10%. This was possible because it is straightforward
to generate and store in advance all of the (li+Uj)mod 1 vectors. Moreover the g(·) function
was easy to evaluate as it could be computed explicitly. Of course, the use of exponential
utility would force us to consider only those distributions that have a moment generating
function.
Other Applications
The results of Figure 3.4 suggest that the randomized LDS approach can be used efficiently
to generate very good dual bounds. One possible application would be for solving portfolio
execution problems where we suspect that the random return vectors are only approximately
normally distributed. In particular, we may suspect that the true return vectors have fatter
tails. In that case we could, for example, use the same OLFC policy (which assumed normal
returns) as before but in order to evaluate it using the dual formulation we would need
to estimate Et[V̂t+1(s̃0:t)] and Et[∇V̂t+1(s̃0:t)′] using the true return distributions. If these
terms cannot be computed analytically, then we could use the approach outlined in this
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(a) γ = 1× 10−7






































(b) γ = 4× 10−7





































(c) γ = 7× 10−7




































(d) γ = 10× 10−7
Figure 3.4: Dual bounds obtained using randomized LDS to estimate dual penalties
72
section. If the resulting duality gap, i.e. the difference between the primal and dual bounds,
was sufficiently small then we would know that we could safely ignore the non-normality
of returns. Otherwise, we would need to adapt our policy to take this non-normality into
account.
3.5.2 Investigating the Temporary Price Impact Model
In Section 3.3.3 we discussed how the dual methodology could be used to determine whether
or not certain market features require explicit modeling. We demonstrate this idea here by
investigating the features of our temporary price impact model from Section 3.4.1. Suppose
the agent suspects that only the time-varying feature of the temporary price impact is im-
portant and that the stochastic component can be safely ignored by the execution policy. To
investigate this conjecture we consider two additional policies. The first policy, which we call
the OLFC-TV policy, assumes the temporary price impact is time-varying but deterministic.
In particular the OLFC-TV policy assumes the temporary price impact at time t is given
by E0[Bt]. The second policy, which we call the OLFC-C policy, assumes the temporary
price impact is constant and equal to its time average across all time periods. Note that the
“true” temporary price impact model remains as described by (3.4.1) to (3.4.3).
The performance of these policies is shown in Figure 3.5 together with the original OLFC
policy and our dual bound. Nor surprisingly we see that the OLFC policy outperforms the
OLFC-TV policy which in turn outperforms the OLFC-C policy. It is interesting to note
the degree of out-performance, however, particularly for higher levels of risk aversion where
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Figure 3.5: Certainty equivalent costs for comparing model features
the OLFC-TV policy performs almost as well as the OLFC policy and much better than
the OLFC-C. In this case we could argue that the agent’s conjecture was justified although
to draw this conclusion more generally we would need a more careful specification and
calibration of the temporary price impact model.
3.5.3 Including a Non-Linear Temporary Price Impact
In Section 3.2, we introduced a model with linear price impacts but of course in practice
the true price dynamics are generally more complex. In this section we therefore investigate
the case where the price dynamics also include a temporary non-linear price impact. (We
cannot include a permanent non-linear price impact in our modeling framework as this will
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introduce the possibility of arbitrage; see Huberman and Stanzl [44], for example.) We let
ht(·) denote this non-linear temporary price impact function at time t so that (3.2.5) is now
replaced by
pt = p̃t +Atst +Btst + ht(st). (3.5.3)
The Primal Problem
If the agent ignores the non-linear impact he will implement a portfolio execution policy that
he perceives as being a good policy for the linear-price impact model of Section 3.2. The
original OLFC policy of Section 3.2 could play the role of this “good” policy. Note that the
dual methodology can be used to determine whether or not the non-linear price impact is
significant and therefore needs to be accounted for in the policy. In particular, if we find the
OLFC policy is close to optimal even in the presence of the non-linear price impact, then
the latter need not be modeled explicitly.
In practice, of course, we would expect the original OLFC policy to be far from opti-
mal implying that the non-linear price impact is significant. In that case the agent should
explicitly account for the non-linear impact in constructing the OLFC policy. This would
be quite straightforward and we could formulate the problem analogously to (B.1-18). We
could also find similar expressions to (3.5.5) and (3.5.6) below for the gradient and Hessian
of the OLFC objective function and it would be reasonable to insist that this Hessian be
positive definite for all s in order to guarantee the convexity of the OLFC problem.
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The Dual Problem
Calculating dual bounds for the non-linear impact model proceeds exactly as in Section 3.3.1.


















s.t. pt = p̃t +Atst +Btst + ht(st)
p̃t+1 = p̃t + rt+1 +Atst
where Ṽt+1 is some suitably linearized approximate value function. The analog to (B.2-1)


























The gradient vector and Hessian matrix of f are
∇f(s) = γf(s)(Qs+ cp,0 +∇h̃(s)) (3.5.5)
Hf(s) = γf(s)
(








t(st)st, ∇h̃(s) is the gradient of h̃ and Hh̃(s) is the Hessian matrix of
h̃. A sufficient condition to guarantee that Hf(s) is positive definite (so that f is therefore
convex) is that h̃ is convex and that Q is positive definite.
3.5.4 Predictable State Dynamics
Some of the earlier papers such as Bertsimas and Lo [11] and Bertsimas et al. [10] (some
details are available in Appendix B.3) allow for a predictable component in the return dy-
namics. In particular, they assumed the price dynamics depended on a state variable, Xt,
which itself had linear dynamics. Assuming the agent is risk-neutral, they were able to solve
recursively for the optimal solution in the same manner as the analysis of Appendix B.1.4.
We could include a similar state variable or vector in our model. Except for some specific
circumstances, we would not be able to solve for the optimal feed-back control policy but we
could still solve for the OLFC policy in that case. It should also be clear that we can again
use a modified version of the OLFC value function to compute dual penalties and therefore
obtain valid dual bounds. We do not pursue this any further as allowing for predictable
price dynamics is generally of less interest than the accurate modeling of price impact and
liquidity effects.
3.5.5 Limit Order Book Models
Building on the earlier single-stock work of Obizhaeva and Wang [56], Alfonsi et al. [2]
and Predoiuet al [58], Giesecke, Tsoukalas and Wang [70] formulate the portfolio execution
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problem at the limit order book (LOB) level. Here we briefly discuss this model and note
that the dual methodology may also be applied in this context.
Their model assumes a two-sided block-shaped order book with infinite depth and time-
invariant density. The mid price is a random walk with zero drift. A buy (sell) order s+t
(s−t ) is executed as a market order against available inventory in the ask (bid) side of the
LOB, creating a linear temporary price impact that moves the best ask (bid) price away from
the mid-price. The order also creates a linear permanent price by moving the mid-price up
(down). Newly arriving limit orders replenish the inventory and cause the distance between














(pbt −Bbs−t )′s−t − (pat +Bas+t )′s+t
))]
(3.5.7)









(s+j − s−j ) + dat (3.5.8)













as+t−1 −A(s+t−1 − s−t−1)) exp(−ρa∆t) (3.5.10)
dbt = (d
b
t−1 −Bbs−t−1 −A(s+t−1 − s−t−1)) exp(−ρb∆t) (3.5.11)
T∑
t=0
(s+t − s−t ) = w0 and s+t , s−t ≥ 0 (3.5.12)
where pat and p
b
t are the best ask/bid prices in the LOB at time t, p̃0 is the initial mid-price
and δt is the bid-ask spread. A is the permanent price impact coefficient matrix while B
a
and Bb are the temporary price impact coefficients for buy and sell orders, respectively.
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Each of these matrices are assumed to be deterministic. In addition Ba and Bb are diagonal
matrices with diagonal elements equal to the inverse of the order book density on the ask
and bid sides, respectively. dat and d
b
t track the deviation of the current ask and bid prices
from their steady state levels and they decay exponentially at constant speeds ρa and ρb
due to order book replenishment. ∆t is the length of a time period. The only uncertainty
comes from the returns, rj, which are IID normally distributed with zero mean and constant
covariance matrix. The objective is to maximize an exponential utility function over the
terminal wealth which is equivalent to minimizing the exponential utility function over cost
in our model.
Giesecke et al. [70] show that the optimal execution policy is deterministic and find an
equivalent quadratic formulation for the problem. Such a result is quite standard in the port-
folio optimization literature and indeed the equivalence of our formulations in Appendices
B.1.3 and B.1.4 are in the same spirit. But once we begin to relax some of the assumptions
in this model then solving for the optimal policy even numerically becomes a very challeng-
ing task and we again find ourselves in the situation of needing to construct and evaluate
good sub-optimal policies. For example if we introduce a state vector, Zt, that drives the
dynamics of the rt’s and the temporary price impact matrices then a dual problem instance



















subject to (3.5.8) to (3.5.12) but with Ba and Bb replaced by Baj and B
b
j where j = t or
t − 1 as appropriate. Note again that Zt does not appear explicitly in any dual problem
instance but instead it changes the distribution of these instances. We see that the dual
problem in (3.5.13) is similar to the dual problem of Section 3.3 and that we could approach
this problem in a similar manner.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Research
Any realistic model of portfolio execution should be able to handle features such as stochastic
variance-covariance dynamics, return-predictability, time-of-day effects as well as stochastic
liquidity / price-impacts and possible risk aversion. Any model which includes these features
will not in general be analytically tractable and so it will be necessary instead to construct
good sub-optimal policies. It is important that these sub-optimal policies can be properly
evaluated and in this chapter we have demonstrated the use of duality methods to do this.
In particular, our model is capable of capturing all of the above effects and our OLFC
policy appears to be capable of generating very good primal bounds while a variation of
the associated OLFC value function also leads to very tight dual bounds. (Of course we
have only shown this to actually be the case for the parameter settings we considered, but
we suspect it to be true more generally for realistic parameter settings.) While these dual
methods have become quite standard in a relatively short period of time, implementing them
is not straightforward in general since the dual optimization problems can be quite complex
and establishing convexity or non-convexity may also require some effort.
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An additional contribution of this chapter is that valid and tight dual bounds can still
be computed efficiently even when the dual penalties are not explicitly available and need
to be estimated via Monte-Carlo. The numerical experiments of Section 3.5.1 where we
used randomized low-discrepancy sequences have demonstrated the validity of this broadly
applicable approach.
We have also demonstrated some useful properties of the dual problem in the context
of portfolio execution problems. For example, we noted that the convexity of the dual
problem does not depend on variance-covariance dynamics or state variable dynamics as
long as these dynamics are not influenced by the execution policy. We have also noted how
the duality technology can be used to determine in advance if a market feature, e.g. the
cross-price impact of Appendix B.3 or the non-linear price-impacts of Section 3.5.3, need to
be accounted for by the portfolio execution policy.
There are several possible future research directions and these include conducting a more
detailed calibration and empirical evaluation of the model we have proposed in this chap-
ter. Another direction is to use duality to study the impact of using misspecified return
distributions. For example, the assumption of (conditional) multivariate normality has been
made throughout this chapter and throughout the literature on single-stock and portfolio
execution. This of course is due to the tractability of the normal distribution. In prac-
tice, however, we might expect conditional returns to only be approximately normal. We
could still construct feasible execution policies in this case by pretending that everything was
normally distributed after which we could use the true model to simulate sample paths to
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estimate valid primal and dual bounds. Of course when computing the penalty terms we
require expectations of the linearized approximate value functions and these expectations
must be evaluated under the true model. If they are not available explicitly then they can
be estimated via nested Monte-Carlo’s as described in Section 3.5.
Another potentially interesting direction is the problem of multi-portfolio execution where
firms need to solve the portfolio execution problem simultaneously for multiple portfolios
rather than just one portfolio. This raises the question as to how we should prioritize
the portfolios. We could, for example, solve each portfolio execution problem separately and
ignore all knowledge of the other portfolio trades that need to be executed. We would expect
this to be far from optimal in general although it would be necessary to first define what is
meant by “optimal”. Towards this end, we would also need to determine how to allocate the
total execution costs fairly across each of the portfolios which is difficult when impact costs
are non-linear. The multi-portfolio execution problem is non-trivial and depending on the
solution technique, can draw on concepts from cooperative or non-cooperative game theory.
It was first studied by O’Cinneide, Scherer and Xu [19] who proposed optimizing the total
“social welfare” without accounting for fairness. Stubbs and Vandenbussche [66] study the
pros and cons of both the cooperative and non-cooperative solution techniques in a static
rather than dynamic context. Once the multi-portfolio execution problem has been properly
formulated, however, then it will be necessary to determine good execution policies. The
duality technology might be very useful in assessing the quality of these policies.
A final direction for future research is understanding just how plausible it is to impose
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conditions that guarantee the convexity of all dual problem instances. There should be
little difficulty in justifying this assumption when the price impacts are assumed to be
deterministic. Huberman and Stanzl [44] provide such a justification in the single stock
case, for example. When the price impacts are stochastic, however, insisting on the positive-
definiteness of the matrix, Q, in (B.2-3) on all dual problem instances is not so easy to justify
from an economic standpoint. From an intuitive viewpoint it seems plausible to insist that
Q should be positive-definite in some average sense (as implied by the positive definiteness
of (B.1-19), for example) but there is no reason to assume that all realizations of Q need to
be positive-definite to avoid the absence of arbitrage.
If we were to consider models where dual convexity was not guaranteed then it should
still be possible to obtain a valid dual bound. In particular, on each dual sample path
we first check if Q is positive-definite. If it is, then we solve this dual problem instance
as before. If Q is not positive-definite, then the dual optimization problem is difficult to
solve in general. But we can still bound the optimal value of such a problem instance. For
example, the exponential term in (3.3.2) is bounded below by zero and if the constraint set
is a bounded polyhedron (as will typically be the case in practice) then LP techniques could
be used to bound the second term in (3.3.2). If relatively few of the Q’s fail to be positive-
definite then we may still be able to obtain a good dual bound in this manner. Another
possibility would be to form the concave dual (see Boyd and Vanderberghe [13], for example)
of the non-convex dual instance. The optimal solution (or indeed a good feasible solution)
to this concave problem will also provide a valid lower bound although it may be difficult to
compute.
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Ultimately we believe the goal is to construct realistic models that can include the various
market effects that are found in practice, that can handle hundreds of securities or more,
that are straightforward to calibrate and for which good sub-optimal policies can easily be
found. Because it is impossible to ever know the true market dynamics, we believe these sub-
optimal policies need to be robust to deviations from the assumed model and that duality
based on information relaxations can play a key role in assessing this robustness.
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Chapter 4
Information Relaxations and Dynamic
Zero-Sum Games
4.1 Introduction
Zero-sum game is a very useful framework with lots of interesting applications including
pursuit-evasion games, heads-up poker, callable bond and many two-person computer games.
In this chapter we apply the duality methods based on information relaxations for stochastic
dynamic problems to dynamic two-person zero-sum games. Our ultimate goal is to apply
these dual techniques to very complex zero-sum games which cannot be solved to optimality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We define the problem and establish
the dual theory for finite horizon zero-sum games in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we outline
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how the approach can be extended to discounted infinite horizon problems as well as more
general stochastic shortest path games. We conclude in Section 4.4.
4.2 Dual Bounds for Finite Horizon Zero-Sum Games
We begin with a finite horizon zero-sum game played by two players, A and B. We index
time according to t = 0, 1, ..., T . and the evolution of information is described by a filtration
F = {F0, ...,FT} with FT = F . We make the simplifying assumption that both A and B
have access to the same information Ft at time t and by insisting that Ft ⊆ Ft+1 ⊆ F for
all t < T we model the assumption that the two players do not forget previously known
information. We assume F0 = {∅,Ω} so player A and B know nothing initially. The state
vector at time t is denoted by xt. We let At(xt) and Bt(xt) be the sets of time-t actions
that are feasible for players A and B, respectively, given the current state is xt. We assume
At(xt) and Bt(xt) are finite sets and that xt evolves according to
xt+1 = ft(xt, at, bt, ωt+1), t = 0, ..., T − 1 (4.2.1)
where at ∈ At(xt) and bt ∈ Bt(xt) are the actions of A and B, respectively, at time t, and
ωt+1 is an Ft+1-measurable random disturbance. After A and B implement their actions at
time t, B makes a payment of g̃t(xt, at, bt) to A. The game ends at time T when B pays
gT (xT ) to A. We assume
1 that each g̃t is Ft-measurable.
1This assumption is not too restrictive. Suppose for example the true amount B pays to A is
ḡ(xt, at, bt, ωt+1) so that it depends on the as yet unobserved disturbance, ωt+1. Then we can replace it
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It is useful to make the distinction between pure and mixed policies. A pure policy chooses
an action deterministically whereas a mixed policy chooses an action randomly. In particular
at time t a mixed policy for player A is a probability distribution ut = {u(at)t | at ∈ A(xt)}
over A’s feasible action set A(xt) such that action at is selected with probability u(at)t . We
note that a pure policy is of course also a mixed policy. We use u = (u0, ..., uT−1) to represent
player A’s policy, and similarly define the probability distribution vt = {v(bt)t | bt ∈ B(xt)}
and the policy v = (v0, ..., vT−1) for player B. If u or v is a pure policy, we can simply write
them as the action sequences a = (a0, ..., aT−1) or b = (b0, ..., bT−1). A joint policy {u,v}
is Ft-adapted if each ut and vt is Ft-measurable. We denote by AF and BF the set of all
Ft-adapted policies for A and B, respectively.
We let gt(xt, ut, vt) denote the time-t expected payment from B to A when they use the
mixed policies ut and vt. Then
2









t g̃t(xt, at, bt), t = 0, ..., T − 1 (4.2.2)
and gt(xt, ut, vt) is Ft-measurable because each g̃t(xt, at, bt) is Ft-measurable. The total
expected payment from B to A under these policies is then
g(u,v) = gT (xT ) +
T−1∑
t=0
gt(xt, ut, vt). (4.2.3)
with g̃t(xt, at, bt) := E[ḡ(xt, at, bt, ωt+1)|Ft] where the expectation is taken over ωt+1, and thus g̃t(xt, at, bt)
is Ft-measurable.
2If A uses a pure policy, at, and B uses a mixed policy, vt, the expected payment (4.2.2) reduces to




t g̃t(xt, at, bt). We note that gt(xt, ut, bt) and gt(xt, at, bt) can be calculated in a
similar manner and that these expressions are all Ft-measurable.
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From A’s perspective, g(u,v) is a reward and so A seeks an optimal Ft-adapted policy to
maximize this reward. From B ’s perspective, g(u,v) is a cost and so B seeks an optimal
Ft-adapted policy to minimize this cost. Let J0(x0) denote the optimal (equilibrium) value











where we have used Et[·] to denote E[·|Ft]. We assume the optimal game value J0(x0) is
bounded in the following discussion. Let Jt(xt) denote the time-t optimal value function of
the game and note that we can compute it recursively according to






gt(xt, ut, vt) + Et
[
Jt+1(f(xt, ut, vt, ωt+1))
]}
, t = 0, ..., T − 1 (4.2.6)
with dynamics in (4.2.1).
4.2.1 Obtaining Dual Bounds for the Zero-Sum Game
If we fix B ’s policy to be v̂ ∈ BF (which may be sub-optimal from B ’s perspective), A’s
problem reduces to
J0(x0; v̂) = sup
a∈AF
E0[g(a, v̂)]. (4.2.7)
where we have restricted A to choosing a pure policy rather than a mixed policy. This
presents no problem since it is well known that if B ’s policy is fixed then A will have an
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optimal pure3 policy. Problem (4.2.7) can be solved via the following DP:
JT (xT ; v̂) = gT (xT ) (4.2.8)
Jt(xt; v̂) = sup
at
{
gt(xt, at, v̂t) + Et
[
Jt+1(f(xt, at, v̂t, ωt+1))
]}
, t = 0, ..., T − 1 (4.2.9)
with dynamics given by (4.2.1) and the understanding that bt is the (generally random)
action obtained when B follows v̂. Note that the optimal solution, J0(x0; v̂), obtained from
(4.2.8) and (4.2.9) is an upper bound on the value of the game, J0(x0). Moreover we have
equality, i.e. J0(x0; v̂) = J0(x0), if v̂ = v
∗ where v∗ is the optimal policy of B obtained from
solving (4.2.5) and (4.2.6). In general, however, it is hard to even solve for J0(x0; v̂) but we
can use the duality methods of BSS (and outlined in Section 4.2.2 below) to find an upper
bound, say J0(x0; v̂, z(v̂)), on J0(x0; v̂) where z(v̂) is a dual-feasible penalty in the language
of BSS.
By a similar argument we can find a lower bound, J0(x0; û, z(û)), on J0(x0; û), the
optimal solution to B ’s problem when A’s policy is fixed at û. Of course we also have
J0(x0; û) ≤ J0(x0) since in general A is free to choose any feasible policy in AF. Combining
these observations we have
J0(x0; û, z(û)) ≤ J0(x0; û) ≤ J0(x0) ≤ J0(x0; v̂) ≤ J0(x0; v̂, z(v̂)). (4.2.10)
The outer inequalities in (4.2.10) follow from the weak duality of BSS. Moreover there ex-
3This is related to the so-called principle of indifference; see Part II, Chapter 2 of Ferguson [32].
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ist dual-feasible penalties, z∗(û) and z∗(v̂) say, for which these outer inequalities become
equalities. This is strong duality:
J0(x0; û, z
∗(û)) = J0(x0; û) ≤ J0(x0) ≤ J0(x0; v̂) = J0(x0; v̂, z∗(v̂)). (4.2.11)
Finally, and as stated earlier if we choose û = u∗ and v̂ = v∗ then the inequalities in (4.2.11)
become equalities. In the next subsection we outline the weak and strong duality results of
BSS that can be used to justify these statements.
4.2.2 Constructing Dual Bounds for Player A’s Dynamic Program
We will focus4 on the problem of constructing an upper bound for the value function,
J0(x0; v̂), that is the solution of (4.2.8) and (4.2.9), which we recall is the DP that A must
solve when B ’s policy is fixed at v̂. We can obtain lower bounds on J0(x0; û) in a similar
manner.
We say that a filtration G = {G0, ...,GT} is a relaxation of the filtration F if, for each t,
Ft ⊆ Gt ⊆ F . For example, the perfect information filtration I = (I0, ..., IT ) is obtained by
taking It = F for all t. Let AG represent the set of Gt-adapted policies for A. Clearly we
have AF ⊆ AG.
Let Z denote the set of functions, z(a, v̂, ω), that depend on A’s policy, a, B ’s fixed
(and mixed) policy, v̂, and the random noise vector ω := (ω0, ..., ωT−1). BSS defines the set,
4BSS can be consulted for all statements in this section regarding dual bounds, weak and strong duality,
and the construction of dual feasible penalties.
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ZF, of dual feasible penalties (for A’s dynamic program) to be those functions that do not
penalize A’s Ft-adapted policies. In particular,
ZF = {z ∈ Z : E0[z(a, v̂, ω)] ≤ 0 for all a ∈ AF}. (4.2.12)
We then have the following weak duality result which follows immediately from the definition
of dual feasibility in (4.2.12).
Proposition 4.2.1. (Weak Duality) For any dual feasible penalty, z ∈ ZF, we have
J0(x0; v̂) ≤ sup
a∈AG
E0[g(a, v̂)− z(a, v̂, ω)] =: J0(x0; v̂, z(v̂)). (4.2.13)
Therefore any dual feasible penalty and information relaxation provides an upper bound
on the optimal value of A’s dynamic program J0(x0; v̂). For a given information relaxation,
we can optimize the upper bound by minimizing it over the set of dual feasible penalties.






E0[g(a, v̂)− z(a, v̂, ω)]
}
. (4.2.14)
We then have the following strong duality result:
Theorem 4.2.2. (Strong Duality) If the primal problem (4.2.7) for player A is bounded,
then the dual problem (4.2.14) has an optimal solution, z∗ ∈ ZF , and there is no duality gap
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so that





E0[g(a, v̂)− z(a, v̂, ω)]
}
. (4.2.15)
An optimal penalty is therefore a dual feasible penalty, z∗ ∈ ZF , for which
J0(x0; v̂) = supa∈AG E0[g(a, v̂)− z
∗(a, v̂, ω)]. We can construct such a z∗ according to







∣∣Gt]− E[Jt+1(xt+1, v̂)∣∣Ft]). (4.2.16)
If we use a dual optimal penalty z∗ together with the perfect information relaxation G = I,
then (4.2.15) reduces to
J0(x0; v̂) = sup
a∈AI






g(a, v̂)− z∗(a, v̂, ω)
}]
(4.2.17)
and in fact the expectation in (4.2.17) is unnecessary since it can be shown that
J0(x0; v̂) = sup
a∈AI
{
g(a, v̂)− z∗(a, v̂, ω)
}
almost surely. In general, however, the Jt(xt; v̂)’s are hard to compute and so it might be
not possible to find an optimal penalty, z∗. Instead we can use an approximation, Ĵt(xt; v̂),
to compute a dual feasible5 penalty, ẑ(a, v̂, ω), using (4.2.16) but with Jt replaced by Ĵt. We
can then obtain a valid and hopefully good upper bound as follows. Assuming again that
5It can be shown that a penalty, ẑ(a, v̂, ω), constructed from (4.2.16) using Ĵt(xt; v̂) instead of Jt is indeed
a dual feasible penalty.
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G = I, we know from weak duality that





g(a, v̂)− ẑ(a, v̂, ω)
}]
. (4.2.18)
The expectation in (4.2.18) therefore yields an upper bound on J0(x0; v̂) and it’s easily esti-
mated via Monte-Carlo simulation: we simply generate N sample paths ω(i) = (ω
(i)
0 , ..., ω
(i)
T−1)
for i = 1, ..., N , and solve the deterministic “inner problem”
J
(i)
0 (x0; v̂, ẑ(v̂)) := sup
a∈AI
{
g(a, v̂)− ẑ(a, v̂, ω(i))
}
. (4.2.19)





0 (x0; v̂, ẑ(v̂)), is then an unbiased estimate of the
upper bound, J0(x0; v̂, ẑ(v̂)).
A Simple Example
We first consider a single-period two-person zero-sum game where the payoff is defined by
an m × n matrix, R. In this game players A and B simultaneously select a row, a, and a
column, b, respectively, after which B pays A the value Ra,b. A mixed policy for player A
is an m× 1 vector u = [u(1) ... u(m)]′ of probabilities that sum to 1 such that A chooses the
a-th row with probability u(a). Similarly, we let v = [v(1) ... v(n)]′ represent player B ’s mixed
policy. The expected payoff to A is then u′Rv.
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 , R(2) =
 8 15
10 12




The state variable xt ∈ {i | i = 1, 2, 3} determines the game R(xt) that is played at time t,
and g̃(xt, at, bt) is then the payoff of that game when A and B choose the at-th row and bt-th
column, respectively at time t. The game begins at t = 0 with A and B playing R(1) so the
initial state is x0 = 1. The next matrix game to be played at time t = 1 is determined by A
and B ’s actions and a transition probability, p(xt, xt+1, at, bt). These transition probabilities









Note of course that P1,2 + P1,3 is equal to the matrix with 1 in every entry. For example,
if A chooses the second row (a0 = 2) and B chooses the first column (b0 = 1) when playing
R(1) at time t = 0, B pays A amount of g̃(x0 = 1, a0 = 2, b0 = 1) = 6. At time t = 1 A
and B will then play game R(2) with probability 0.4, or game R(3) with probability 0.6. We
assume the random variable, ω1, which drives the state transition is uniformly distributed
so that the state evolution can be written as
x1 = f0(x0, a0, b0, ω1) = 2 · 1{ω1≤p(1,2,a0,b0)} + 3 · (1− 1{ω1≤p(1,2,a0,b0)}) (4.2.20)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. The optimal policies and value functions for this
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0 1 [0.5 0.5]′ [0.75 0.25]′ 5
1 2 [0 1]′ [1 0]′ 10
1 3 [1 0]′ [0 1]′ −10
2-period zero-sum game are easily calculated using standard techniques and are given in
Table 4.1.
We can compute an upper bound for the fair value of the game by fixing B ’s policy
and then solving A’s corresponding DP. Towards this end, suppose B fixes his policy at
v̂ = (v̂0 = [0.6 0.4]
′, v̂1 = v
∗
1(x1)), the game reduces to A’s dynamic program with optimal
solutions
J1(x1; v̂) = J1(x1) (4.2.21)





 = 5.6 (4.2.22)




In (4.2.21) because B fixes v̂1 = v
∗
1(x1) at t = 1, J1(x1; v̂) is then equal to J1(x1) given in
Table 4.1. In (4.2.22) at time t = 0, R is the expected total payoff matrix, and thus A’s
optimal game value under B ’s fixed policy v̂ is J0(x0; v̂) = 5.6. We note that J0(x0; v̂) is an
upper bound on the value of game, J0(x0) = 5.
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Weak Duality
For more complex games we would not be able to compute J0(x0; v̂) but we can instead
use the information relaxation approach to compute an upper bound on J0(x0; v̂). Suppose




∣∣F0] where Ĵ1(x1; v̂) is an approximate value for player A’s DP. For illustrative6
purposes, we take Ĵ1(x1; v̂) = 8 · 1{x1=2} − 8 · 1{x1=3}.
We estimate the dual bound by simulating 10,000 dual problem instances, i.e. by sim-
ulating 10,000 values of ω1, solving the deterministic dual inner problem (4.2.19) for each
instance, and then taking the average of the optimal objective functions. Our simulation
yielded an estimated upper bound J0(x0; v̂, ẑ(v̂)) = 5.82 with a standard error of 0.02. Note
that our numerical results, i.e. J0(x0) < J0(x0; v̂) < J0(x0; v̂, ẑ(v̂)), are consistent with weak
duality in (4.2.10).
Strong Duality




to (4.2.16) using J1(x1; v̂) in (4.2.21), each dual inner problem (4.2.19) yields an upper bound
J0(x0; v̂, z
∗(v̂)) = 5.6 = J0(x0; v̂). We have therefore demonstrated strong duality (for B ’s
fixed policy, v̂) as given in (4.2.11).
Note also that if we fixed B ’s policy at v∗ and repeated the numerical calculations above,
then we would obtain J0(x0) = J0(x0;v
∗) = J0(x0;v
∗, z∗(v∗)). Corresponding lower bounds
6This is the game value at time t = 1 if A always chooses first row and B always chooses first column
when playing R(x1).
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for J0(x0) can be obtained by fixing A’s policy and solving or lower bounding player B ’s
resulting DP.
4.3 Dual Bounds for Stochastic Shortest Path Games
In this section we extend the information relaxation approach to more general stochastic
shortest-path (SSP) zero-sum games. Note that infinite horizon discounted games can be
modeled as SSP zero-sum games so the formulation is quite general and indeed general
conditions exist to guarantee that these games have an optimal value. Assuming these games
(i) have an optimal value and (ii) have optimal policies under which the game terminates
finitely almost surely, we can replicate the information relaxation methods of Section 4.2 to
obtain valid dual bounds. Our discussion below assumes7 that both (i) and (ii) hold.
One potential difficulty that arises in constructing dual bounds in this case is in simulating
a dual sample path. In particular, how many time periods are there in such a dual path?
In general the number of periods (before absorption into a terminal state) will depend on
the policies employed by the two players but we don’t know these policies in advance so
how can we simulate such a path? Very recent work of Brown and Haugh [14] describes
several approaches for addressing this problem. One such approach8 is to use the Rogers [60]
approach to finite horizon problems with the perfect information relaxation. Under his
approach dual sample paths are simulated under a reference transition probability measure,
7We note that (i) and (ii) hold for the example that we consider in this section. In fact the game terminates
after a finite number of periods almost surely regardless of what policies the players employ.
8There are better approaches; see Brown and Haugh [14] for details.
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P ∗, that is action-independent. In the context of our (generally infinite-horizon) SSP games,
we can use such a P ∗ to generate dual sample paths as long as all such paths terminate after
a finite number of periods P ∗-almost surely. We also need to choose P ∗ so that there exists
an optimal policies whose induced probability measure (over sample paths) is absolutely
continuous with respect to the measure induced by P ∗.
More specifically dual bounds are constructed as follows, where for ease of exposition
we use the perfect information relaxation, I. We generate the state path x = (x0, ..., xT )
using the action-independent transition matrix P ∗ where p∗(xt, xt+1) denotes the transition
probability from state xt to xt+1. Note that while T is random, this does not present a
problem in simulating a dual sample path because P ∗ is action-independent and so the
realized value of T does not depend on the policies of the two players.
Because we used P ∗ to generate dual paths and not the natural transition matrix induced
by the players’ actions, it is necessary to multiply the various rewards and dual value func-
tions by appropriate action-dependent Radon-Nikodym derivative terms; see Rogers [60] or
Brown and Haugh [14]. In particular, suppose we fix B ’s policy at v̂ and use a dual feasi-
ble penalty, ẑ, that has been constructed from some approximated value function, Ĵt(xt; v̂).





















ϕ(xτ , xτ+1, aτ , v̂τ ) (4.3.2)




t p(xt, xt+1, at, b̂t)
p∗(xt, xt+1)
(4.3.3)
and where the numerator in the Radon-Nikodym derivative term (4.3.3) is the probability
that the game transitions from xt to xt+1 under A’s action at and B ’s mixed policy v̂t.
Note also that the expectations in (4.3.1) are taken with respect to the action-dependent
transitions p(·). The objective in (4.3.1) is fully deterministic and can be solved recursively
according to
JT (xT ; v̂, ẑ(v̂)) = gT (xT )
J t(xt; v̂, ẑ(v̂)) = sup
at
{




+ ϕ(xt, xt+1, at, v̂t)
(
J t+1(xt+1; v̂, ẑ(v̂))− Ĵt+1(xt+1; v̂)
)}
, t = 0, ..., T − 1.
A dual bound is then estimated by simulating N sample paths under P ∗, solving (4.3.1)
along each of these paths, and then taking the average of the optimal objective functions.
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Example: A Stochastic Shortest-Path Matrix Game








The state variable is xt and a value of xt ∈ {1, 2} implies that R(xt) is played at time t. The
























j=1 Pi,j for i = 1, 2 is a matrix with every entry equal to 1. This of course must
be the case. Suppose now, for example, that x0 = 1 so that A and B initially play R
(1). If
A chooses the second row (a0 = 2) and B chooses the first column (b0 = 1), then B pays A
1 unit and at time t = 1 they will play R(2) with probability 0.4, and enter the absorbing
state with probability 0.6.
Table 4.2: Suboptimal policies for the SSP matrix game
A’s policy B ’s policy
u(xt = 1) u(xt = 2) v(xt = 1) v(xt = 2)
û(1) [0.7500 0.2500]’ [0.2500 0.7500]’ v̂(1) [0.7500 0.2500]’ [0.2500 0.7500]’
û(2) [0.4269 0.5731]’ [0.3970 0.6030]’ v̂(2) [0.5315 0.4685]’ [0.4897 0.5103]’
û(3) [0.4135 0.5865]’ [0.3996 0.6004]’ v̂(3) [0.5220 0.4780]’ [0.4995 0.5005]’
In order to compute dual bounds we begin with the two sub-optimal policies, û(1) and
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v̂(1), for players A and B, respectively. These policies are defined in the first row of Table
4.2. We can simulate these policies to obtain estimates of the game value, J0(x0, û
(1), v̂(1)) as
a function of x0. We use these estimates as our approximate value function, Ĵt(xt), that we
use to construct a dual feasible penalty. Finally, we can then estimate dual lower and upper
bounds on the optimal game value by simulating sample paths and solving the corresponding
dual problem instances as in (4.3.1). The sample paths (for estimating the dual bounds)

















The corresponding game value and dual bounds (mean and standard errors) are displayed
in the first two rows of Table 4.3 where J0(x0, û
(i), v̂(i)) are estimated using 106 simulated
paths and J0(x0; v̂
(i), ẑ(v̂(i))) and J0(x0; û
(i), ẑ(û(i))) are estimated using 103 paths.
The dual lower and upper bounds are quite far apart and we expect this is because
û(1) and v̂(1) are far from optimal. We therefore perform a policy iteration to find new and
improved suboptimal policies (û(i+1), v̂(i+1)) based on J0(x0, û
(i), v̂(i)) for i = 1, 2. These new
policies are also displayed in Table 4.2. We can also estimate their game values and use them
to construct dual feasible penalties and dual bounds. These game values and dual bounds are
displayed in Table 4.3. As expected, we see that the duality gap, i.e. the difference between
the dual upper and lower bounds, decreases with each policy iteration for each value of x0. In
fact, we can use our dual bounds to see that the estimates J0(1) = 2.025 and J0(2) = −1.99
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are very accurate9 with high probability. Note also that we did not actually compute the
optimal game value for this problem.
Table 4.3: Game values, dual upper and lower bounds for the SSP matrix game. Means
and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported for each of the two possible initial states,
x0 = 1 and x0 = 2.
Suboptimal x0 = 1 x0 = 2
Polices J0(x0; û
(i)) J0(x0, û
(i), v̂(i)) J0(x0, v̂
(i)) J0(x0, û
(i)) J0(x0, û
(i), v̂(i)) J0(x0, v̂
(i))
û(1), v̂(1)
-0.2407 3.0123 3.8266 -3.2084 -1.4342 -0.3932
(0.0246) (0.0023) (0.0108) (0.0201) (0.0030) (0.0230)
û(2), v̂(2)
1.9212 2.0242 2.0953 -2.0366 -1.9969 -1.9445
(0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0007)
û(3), v̂(3)
2.0221 2.0225 2.0228 -1.9976 -1.9973 -1.9972
(0.00001) (0.0029) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0030) (0.00001)
4.4 Conclusions and Further Research
The main contribution of this chapter is to generalize the work of Beveridge and Joshi [12]
on optimal stopping games to dynamic zero-sum games. We used the general results of BSS
and Rogers [60] on information relaxations for general dynamic programs to do this. While
the results were straightforward to prove, there are many interesting applications including
pursuit-evasion games, heads-up poker and many two-person computer games. While we
considered relatively simple numerical examples in this chapter, the ultimate value of this
work will be in applying it successfully to more realistic and interesting applications.
There are several potential problems that arise when we consider these more complex
applications. For example, many zero-sum games such as heads-up poker are more naturally
9We can of course use standard Monte-Carlo methods to construct conservative confidence intervals for
the optimal game values J0(1) and J0(2).
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studied in so-called10 extensive form whereas our dual formulation requires the games to be
modeled in strategic form. While it is certainly possible to go back and forth between these
two forms, it is not clear how much work is required to do so. Nor is it clear that sub-optimal
policies that have been designed for the extensive form of the game are easily handled in
strategic form. Computing easy-to-use dual penalties from these sub-optimal strategies may
also be problematic.
Another potential difficulty relates to the issue of private information. Our analysis has
assumed the players do not have private sources of information but in many games, however,
private information does exist. For example, in heads-up poker each player knows his two
“hole” cards but does not know his opponent’s “hole” cards until the end of the game if ever.
From a theoretical perspective, it should be easy to handle this complication but it may well
raise practical problems that are difficult to overcome with limited computing resources.
There are many other interesting complications related to learning and bounded ratio-
nality that would also be interesting to explore. We hope to address some of these problems
in future research.
10See, for example, Ferguson [32] for a detailed discussion on zero-sum games as well as the strategic and
extensive forms of these games.
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Appendix A
Supplemental Content for Chapter 2
A.1 Generating LDS Scenarios for the RBH and Looka-
head Policies
At each time period t, we generateM = 100, 000 scenarios of time T (RBH) or time min(T, t+
h) (h-period look-ahead) security prices and market state variables. Using the dynamics
specified in (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) the distribution of (pT , zT ) or (pt+h, zt+h) conditional on the
information available at time t is available in closed form. We can therefore generate time
T or t+ h scenarios directly, i.e. in a single step, rather than having to simulate sceanarios
at intermediate time points using (2.5.1) and (2.5.2).
We used quasi-Monte-Carlo [38] and low discrepancy sequences (LDS) instead of naive
Monte-Carlo since LDS fill the “unit cube” more uniformly. In our numerical experiments
we used an (K + 1)-dimensional Sobol sequence where the first K dimensions were used to
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generate samples of the stock prices and the last dimension was used to generate samples for
the market state. We produced these LDS using MATLAB’s LDS functionality. We rejected
the first 1000 points, retained every 101-st point thereafter, and also applied the so-called
Matousek-Affine-Owen scrambling scheme.
A.2 The Exact-Tax Basis FUL Problem
The exact tax-basis FUL problem is less realistic than the corresponding LUL problem in
that net tax losses in any period earn an immediate rebate under the FUL assumption.
However, it is an easier problem and for this reason most of the literature on tax-aware
portfolio optimization focuses on the FUL model. In this Section, we briefly describe how
our LUL problem formulation is easily adapted to the FUL case.
A.2.1 The FUL Model and Problem Formulation
Under the FUL tax rule, the investor receives tax rebates if there are realized capital losses.




(pt − pj)′(nj,t−1 − nj,t) (A.2-1)
which is no longer restricted to be non-negative. In particular, when gt < 0 so that there are
net capital losses, the agent pays a negative tax of τgt, i.e. the agent receives an tax rebate
that is available for immediate investment. Since it is optimal for the agent to realize any
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capital losses, we do not need lt to track the accumulated unused losses. By substituting (A.2-
1) into the budget constraint (2.2.7) and removing the LUL constraints (2.2.11)–(2.2.13), we









s.t. b0 + p
′











p′tnj,t−1 t ≥ 1 (A.2-4)
nt,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 0 (A.2-5)
nj,t−1 ≥ nj,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 1, j < t (A.2-6)
bt ≥ 0 t ≥ 0 (A.2-7)
and security price and market state dynamics.




t,t] denote the vector of time-t decision variables and let
X0 :=
{




xt | xt ∈ Ft satisfies constraints (A.2-4) to (A.2-7) at time t
}
, t ≥ 1.
denote the feasible set of trades at times 0 and t > 0, respectively.
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A.2.2 Sub-Optimal Policies
While there are fewer variables and constraints in the exact tax-basis FUL problem when
compared to the exact tax-basis LUL problem, it is still path-dependent and very challenging
to solve to optimality. All the sub-optimal polices discussed in Section 2.3, however, can be
easily adapted for the exact tax-basis FUL problem.
A.2.3 Dual Bound
We can use the information relaxations methods of Section 2.4 to construct unbiased upper
bounds for the exact tax-basis FUL problem. After making the variable transformation














(pt − pj)′n̂j,t = bt−1r0 +
t−1∑
j=0




n̂t,j = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
nt,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 0
n̂j,t ≥ 0 t ≥ 1, j < t
bt ≥ 0 t ≥ 0.
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Each such dual instance has (T +1)(KT +2K +2)/2 variables and TK +T +1 constraints,
again ignoring non-negativity constraints.
We mentioned in Section 2.2 that the optimal value function, V N0 , of the no-tax problem
may not be an upper bound for the optimal value function V FUL0 for the FUL problem. This
possibly counter-intuitive result is perhaps best understood via a simple example. Consider
a multi-period economy with no cash account and where the returns on all securities are
symmetrically distributed about zero. As usual, we assume no short-sales. Because there is
no cash account the risk-averse agent is forced to invest all her wealth in the risky securities.
In the FUL setting, taxes therefore provide a mechanism for smoothing returns in that they
offset losses and reduce gains symmetrically. Because the expected security returns are zero
we expect V FUL0 > V
N
0 in this case. It should also be clear, however, that the set X F of
feasible adapted policies for the exact tax-basis FUL problem is not a subset of the set, XN
, of feasible adapted policies for the no-tax problem. As a result, the penalty in (2.4.5) may
no longer be dual feasible for the FUL problem since the first-order-conditions (2.4.6) may
no longer hold for all x ∈ X F .
We can, however, construct a dual penalty using an approximation Ṽt to the optimal








where x0:t denotes the sub-vector of x corresponding to all the decision variables up to and
including time t. BSS [16] showed that the penalty defined in (A.2-9) is dual feasible, i.e.
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E0[π] = 0 for any Ft-adapted feasible policy x. Moreover, if we choose Ṽt = V FULt , the
dual bound computed using the corresponding penalty π is equal to V FUL0 almost surely, i.e.
strong duality holds.
It is clear that π(x) only depends on the shape of Ṽt because any constant terms will
cancel out in (A.2-9). In order to preserve concavity of the objective function, we take Ṽt+1
to be a first order Taylor’s series expansion of V Nt+1 about some Ft-adapted policy x∗t which





t )) +∇xtV Nt+1(wt+1(x∗t ))(xt − x∗t ). (A.2-10)






j=0(pt+1 − pj)′nj,t. The quality of the dual bound will clearly
depend on the policy x∗t . In our numerical results, we found that the policy x
∗
t given by the
h-step look-ahead policy led to a superior bound.
In order to compute the dual penalty (A.2-9), we need to calculate Et[V Nt+1(wt+1(x∗t ))]
and
Et[∇xtV Nt+1(wt+1(x∗t ))] where the conditional expectations are taken with respect to the un-
certainty that is revealed at time t + 1. We are not able to compute these expectations
explicitly and so we use nested1 Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate them.
1BSS [16] showed that the resulting bounds are still valid dual bounds. More recently, Haugh and
Wang [43] show that the nested Monte-Carlo can be done very accurately and efficiently using suitably
randomized low discrepancy sequences.
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A.3 The Average Tax-Basis LUL Problem
Under the average tax basis rule the tax basis for any security in the portfolio is defined as
the average price at which the shares in the portfolio were purchased. The advantage of this
is that at any time t there is only one tax basis per security. In contrast, under the exact
tax basis approach it is possible to have t separate tax bases for each security at each time t.
Consequently, the average tax basis formulation results in significantly fewer state variables
and is therefore relatively easier to solve. We consider the primal and dual version of the
average tax-basis problem in this Appendix.
A.3.1 Problem Formulation
Let s+t,k (resp. s
−
t,k) denote the number of shares of security k purchased (resp. sold) at
time t. Let st,k denote the number of shares in security k held after trading at time t, and













st := [st,1...st,K ]
′ and p̃t := [p̃t,1...p̃t,K ]
′. Using these variables, we can formulate the average
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s.t st = st−1 + s
+
t − s−t with s0 = s+0 t ≥ 1 (A.3-2)
b0 + p
′
0s0 = w0 (A.3-3)
bt + p
′
tst + τgt = bt−1r0 + p
′
tst−1 t ≥ 1 (A.3-4)
s+t ≥ 0 t ≥ 0 (A.3-5)
st−1 ≥ s−t ≥ 0, t ≥ 1 (A.3-6)
bt ≥ 0 t ≥ 0 (A.3-7)
gt + lt = (pt − p̃t−1)′s−t + lt−1 t ≥ 1 (A.3-8)
gt ≥ 0 t ≥ 1 (A.3-9)
lt ≤ 0, l0 = 0 t ≥ 1 (A.3-10)
p̃0 = p0 (A.3-11)
p̃t,kst,k = p̃t−1,k(st−1,k − s−t,k) + pt,ks
+
t,k ∀k, t ≥ 1 (A.3-12)
and security price and market state dynamics
where (A.3-2) updates the security positions after trading at time t, (A.3-3) (resp. (A.3-4))
is the budget constraint for t = 0 (resp. t > 0), (A.3-5) and (A.3-6) prohibit short-sales,
(A.3-7) prohibits borrowing from the cash account, and (A.3-8)–(A.3-10) formulate the LUL
tax rule.
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The average tax basis for each security is initially set to the time t = 0 price in (A.3-
11). Suppose the agent buys s+t,k > 0 shares and sells s
−
t,k > 0 shares of security k at




t,k, and the new tax basis is p̃t,k =
(p̃t−1,k(st−1,k − s−t,k) + pt,ks
+
t,k)/st,k. This rule is implemented in (A.3-12).






s′t gt lt p̃
′








xt | xt ∈ Ft satisfies (A.3-2), (A.3-4)–(A.3-10) and (A.3-12) at time t
}
, t ≥ 1,
denote the sets of feasible trades at times t = 0 and t ≥ 1, respectively. Note that the
tax-basis is not an argument of Xt as it was in the exact tax basis case; this is because the
tax basis is now a decision variable and is included in xt.
A.3.2 Suboptimal Policies
Although we now have product terms (A.3-8) and (A.3-12), these terms do not cause any
difficulty in adapting our sub-optimal policies from Section 2.3 to the average tax-basis
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whereM denotes the number of time T scenarios used to approximate the time T uncertainty.
The average tax basis p̃t−1 is known before trading at time t, and is therefore not a decision
variable here; hence, (A.3-8) is now a linear constraint. The quadratic term p̃t,kst,k in (A.3-
14) can be linearized by replacing it by the right hand side of (A.3-12). Consequently, all
the constraints in (A.3-13) are linear, and (A.3-13) is a convex optimization problem.
After substituting for st using (A.3-2) and then applying the same smoothing technique














(s+t − s−t )− τ g̃
(m)







































t , gt and lt. Note that the number of
decision variables in (A.3-15) does not increase with t and is considerably fewer than that
in the exact tax-basis problem (2.3.9). We can use (A.3-16) to substitute for g̃
(m)
T (xt) in the
objective function and then, in addition to the non-negativity constraints, there will only
be two remaining constraints, namely (A.3-4) and (A.3-8). When we solve this problem
with the SQP algorithm of Section 2.3.3, it takes approximately one second to solve all 20
problems on a single sample path. In contrast, the corresponding exact tax-basis problem
takes approximately three seconds to solve all 20 problems.
We also note that it is similarly straightforward to compute the optimal trades for the
h-step lookahead policy.
A.3.3 Dual Bound
It is easy to see that Lemma 2.2.1 holds regardless of how the tax-basis is computed and
that the no-tax value function is a valid upper bound for the average tax-basis LUL problem
(A.3-1). However, this bound is likely to be too conservative as we saw in the exact tax
basis case of Section 2.5. We therefore want to use the information relaxations approach to








where the the sample path of prices {pt : t ≥ 0} is known, and the average tax basis p̃t,k,
trades s−t,k and st,k, are all decision variables. Thus, (A.3-8) and (A.3-12) are now non-convex
quadratic constraints, and the inner optimization problem that we need to solve in order to
compute the upper bound is non-convex. Recall that we need to compute the global optimum
of the inner optimization problem in order to obtain a valid dual bound. Since it is hard in
general to solve a non-convex optimization problem, tackling (A.3-17) directly does not lead
to an efficient strategy for computing provably valid dual bounds.
We note here, however, that we can still produce a valid dual bound for the average
tax-basis LUL problem if we can either solve (A.3-17) exactly or obtain an upper bound for
(A.3-17) along each dual sample path. So suppose now that we simulate I dual sample paths
and let V
(i)
up be the optimal solution of the dual problem on the i-th path. Let Io ⊆ I be
those dual paths on which we can compute V
(i)
up , and let Iu := I − Io be the paths on which
we can only obtain an upper bound, V̄
(i)
up , for V
(i)

















so that the right-hand side of (A.3-18) is a still a valid dual bound. Our approach, which we
outline below, produces such a bound. Moreover, we shall see that the quality of this bound
remains very good because, at least in our numerical experiments, V̄
(i)
up is very close to V
(i)
up
for those dual paths in Iu.
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Solving with BARON
Tawarmalani and Sahinidis [68] proposed a polyhedral branch-and-cut approach to perfor-
m global optimization for non-convex optimization problems. Their algorithm generated
polyhedral cutting planes and relaxations for multivariate non-convex problems, and their
algorithm was implemented in the BARON solver [61].
Explicitly imposing tight lower and upper bounds for decision variables can significantly
improve the efficiency of the BARON solver. We can take advantage of this as follows. First
recall that rt denotes the time t return vector and that rt, for t = 1, ..., T , is known on each





provides an upper bound on the time t wealth of the investor. (The max operator in (A.3-19)
returns the maximum of r0 and all elements in the return vector rj.) We also note that the
average tax-basis for each security at time t must lie between the lowest and highest prices
of that security along the sample path up until time t. Given these two observations, we can
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impose the following bounds for the decision variables on each dual sample path:
0 ≤ s+t ≤ w̄t/pt (A.3-20)
0 ≤ s−t ≤ w̄t/pt (A.3-21)
0 ≤ st ≤ w̄t/pt (A.3-22)
0 ≤ gt ≤ w̄t (A.3-23)
−w̄t−1 ≤ lt ≤ 0 (A.3-24)
min(p0, ...,pt) ≤ p̃t ≤ max(p0, ...,pt). (A.3-25)
In our numerical experiments with BARON, we attempted to solve problem (A.3-17) with
the additional constraints (A.3-20) to (A.3-25). We set the solving time limit for each dual
path to be one minute and we used 5,000 paths in our numerical experiments. The global
optimum on approximately 40% of these paths was found with a relative error of 10−6 within
one minute. For the remaining 60% of the paths we used the best upper bound that was
returned by BARON when it stopped after reaching the one-minute cutoff.
A.3.4 Numerical Experiments
In our numerical experiments we used the same problem setting as described in Section 2.5.
Because of the time required by BARON to solve or upper bound the dual problems, we only
considered the case where τ = 40%, γ = 3 and ρ = .4. The results are shown in Table A.1
and they can be compared to the exact tax basis results in the corresponding row of Table
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Table A.1: Results for average tax-basis LUL problem with tax rate τ = 40%
Parameters Sub-Optimal Policies Upper Bounds
γ ρ (%) V tb V mtb V bh V rbh V hl V gd V
N
0
3 0.4 CE return 1.80 1.89 1.84 1.96 1.99 2.19 2.61
95% C.I (1.80, 1.81) (1.89, 1.89) (1.81, 1.86) (1.95, 1.98) (1.98, 2.00) (2.19, 2.20)
3. We see that the tax-blind, modified tax-blind and the buy-and-hold policies all perform
identically to the exact tax basis case. (This must be the case for the buy-and-hold policy
since this policy only trades at time t = 0). The RBH and h-step look-ahead policies have
a CE return that is only 1 basis point lower than the corresponding exact tax basis policies.
This is consistent with the observation of DeMiguel and Uppal [28] who noted (in the one- or
two stock case) that the CE loss in wealth is small when using the average tax basis instead
of the exact tax basis.
The dual bound, V gd , was constructed using the same gradient penalty that we used for
the the exact tax basis problem and by then using the BARON solver as described earlier.
We note that V gd is only one basis point higher than the corresponding exact tax-basis case
and this suggests that the Tawarmalani and Sahinidis [68] approach is a viable approach for
obtaining good dual bounds for the average-cost tax basis formulation.
A.4 The Average Tax-Basis FUL Formulation
As discussed in Appendix A.2.1, under the FUL tax rule the taxable capital gains gt at time
t is given by
gt = (pt − p̃t−1)′s−t . (A.4-1)
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Substituting (A.4-1) into (A.3-4) and removing the LUL tax rule constraints (A.3-8)–(A.3-













s.t st = st−1 + s
+






tst + τ(pt − p̃t−1)′s−t = bt−1r0 + p′tst−1 t ≥ 1
s+t ≥ 0 t ≥ 0
st−1 ≥ s−t ≥ 0 t ≥ 1
bt ≥ 0 t ≥ 0
p̃0 = p0
p̃t,kst,k = p̃t−1,k(st−1,k − s−t,k) + pt,ks
+
t,k ∀k, t ≥ 1
and security price and market state dynamics.
Comparing (A.4-2) with the average tax-basis LUL problem (A.3-1), we note that (A.4-2) has
the same structure but fewer decision variables and constraints. The analysis of Appendix
A.3 can also be applied here although we do note the no-tax model no longer provides an
upper bound because of the FUL tax rule.
Appendix B
Supplemental Content for Chapter 3
B.1 Solving for the Sub-Optimal Policies
Here we consider the approaches we follow for obtaining the various policies outlined in
Section 3.2.2. In each of Appendices B.1.1, B.1.2 and B.1.4 we assume that no-short-sales
constraints are not imposed. When we discuss convexity and existence of solutions we restrict




B.1.1 The Risk-Neutral Policy
Let Vt(·) denote the time t value function for the problem faced by a risk-neutral agent. At
time T the agent needs to buy all remaining shares so that sT = wT . We also have
VT (p̃T ,wT ,AT ,BT ) = p
′






































w′T−1ET−1[GT ]wT−1 + p̃′T−1wT−1 (B.1-3)
where we have used (B.1-1) to substitute for VT in (B.1-2) and then used the price dynamics
of Section 3.2.1 and wT = wT−1 − sT−1 in obtaining (B.1-3) and where we have defined
Nss,T−1 := ET−1[GT ] +BT−1 +B′T−1 (B.1-4)
Nws,T−1 := ET−1[GT ]−A′T−1. (B.1-5)
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Assuming Nss,T−1 is positive definite, then the objective function in (B.1-3) is convex and












GT−1 := ET−1[GT ]−N′ws,T−1N−1ss,T−1Nws,T−1. (B.1-7)
















Nss,t := Et[Gt+1] +Bt +B′t (B.1-8)
Nws,t := Et[Gt+1]−A′t. (B.1-9)
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Gt := Et[Gt+1]−N′ws,tN−1ss,tNws,t. (B.1-12)
We note that the optimal trading quantities, s∗t , depend on wt only, and not on the price
vector p̃t or the stochastic variance-covariance process. It is not path-independent, however,
due to its dependence on At and Bt which are in general stochastic. Note that if any Nss,t
fails to be positive definite then the agent’s time t objective function will be unbounded from
below (in the absence of constraints) and economic considerations alone would imply that
this possibility should be ruled out. One way to do this would be to first impose sufficient
structure on the dynamics of At and Bt so that Et[Gt+1] can be computed analytically. We
could then look to impose additional conditions that guarantee the positive-definiteness of
the Nss,t’s.
Regardless, we could only implement the policy given by (B.1-10) if we can solve for the
Gt’s analytically. One situation where it is straightforward to determine the optimality of
(B.1-10) and actually implement the policy is when the the At’s and Bt’s are deterministic.
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Indeed if we assume theAt’s andBt’s are constant across time then it is possible to determine
explicit expressions for s∗t . In Appendix B.1.2 we also identify a particular case where the
risk-neutral and simple policies coincide.
In the numerical results of Section 3.4 we assumed that the Bt’s were stochastic and so we
were not able to implement the risk-neutral policy. Instead we implemented the risk-neutral
OLFC policy as discussed in Section 3.2.2 and at the end of Appendix B.1.3.
B.1.2 When the Simple and Risk-Neutral Policies Coincide
Suppose the following two conditions both hold:
(i) At and Bt are martingales: Et[At+1] = At and Et[Bt+1] = Bt.
(ii) At and Bt are symmetric: At = A
′
t and Bt = B
′
t.
Then the simple and risk-neutral policies coincide and we can show this by induction as
follows. At time T , we have GT = 2AT + 2BT and s
∗
T = wT . Under conditions (i) and (ii),
equations (B.1-4) to (B.1-7) reduce to
Nss,T−1 = ET−1[GT ] +BT−1 +B′T−1 = 2AT−1 + 4BT−1


















and in this case the simple and risk-neutral policies do indeed coincide. Suppose now that













T − (t+ 1) + 1
wt+1.
Then (B.1-8), (B.1-9), (B.1-12) and (B.1-10) yield


































T − t+ 1
wt (B.1-13)
and by (B.1-13) we see the inductive step is complete. s̃, s̃
B.1.3 Computing the OLFC Policy When sj ≥ 0 Is Imposed
We now consider calculation of the OLFC when non-negativity constraints on the sj’s are
imposed. It should be clear that imposing additional convex constraints on the sj’s would
also be straightforward. We first note that equations (3.2.5) and (3.2.6) imply






ri +Ajsj +Bjsj for j = t, . . . , T. (B.1-14)
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The OLFC policy assumes the price impact matrices evolve deterministically by taking their
time-t conditional expectations. We therefore substitute (B.1-14) into the objective function
in (3.2.10) but with Aj and Bj replaced by Et[Aj] and Et[Bj], respectively. We then see the











































where we have used the fact that wj =
∑T
i=j si for j = t, . . . , T and switched the order
of summation to obtain the last term in (B.1-15). The OLFC policy also assumes the
rj’s are IID normal with mean vector 0 and conditional covariance matrix, Σj = Σt, for







































Because the exponential function is monotonic increasing, we can ignore it so that solving

















sj ≥ 0 for j = t, . . . , T
where
QOLFC,t :=
Et[At +A′t +Bt +B′t] Et[A′t] . . . Et[A′t]
Et[At] Et[At+1 +A′t+1 +Bt+1 +B′t+1] . . . Et[A′t+1]
. . . . . . . . . . . .






O O O . . . O
O Σt Σt . . . Σt
O Σt 2Σt . . . 2Σt
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




where O denotes the n × n zero matrix. We first note that QΣ,t may be expressed as a
positively weighted sum of positive semi-definite matrices according to
QΣ,t = γ

O O O . . . O
O Σt Σt . . . Σt
O Σt Σt . . . Σt
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




O O O . . . O
O O O . . . O
O O Σt . . . Σt
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




O O O . . . O
O O O . . . O
O O O . . . O
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O O O . . . Σt

.
and so it follows that QΣ,t is itself positive semi-definite. As stated in Section 3.3.1 it seems
appropriate to insist on the positive-definiteness ofQOLFC,t so that the OLFC decision-maker
does not perceive that there are arbitrage opportunities in the market. In Appendix B.2.1
we will provide sufficient conditions to guarantee that QOLFC,t is indeed positive definite. If
these conditions are satisfied (as they are in the numerical experiments of Section 3.4) then
QOLFC,t +QΣ,t will be positive definite so that the OLFC policy can be found by solving a
constrained convex quadratic optimization problem.
We also note that the risk-neutral OLFC policy can be obtained by taking γ = 0 and















B.1.4 Computing the OLFC Policy When sj ≥ 0 Is Not Imposed
If we drop the non-negativity constraints on the sj’s then at each time t the OLFC policy can
be computed analytically and very quickly using dynamic programming. Recall the agent








for all j ≥ t and all constant vectors, w. We use V olj (·) for j ≥ t to denote the expected
utility of trading from time j onwards as perceived by the agent at time t. The dynamics
of Section 3.2.1, but now taking Σj = Σt and replacing the Aj’s and Bj’s by their time-t
conditional expectations for all j ≥ t, imply that
V olT (p̃T ,wT ) = exp
(












where GT := Et[AT +A′T +BT +B′T ]. At time T − 1 the agent needs to solve
V olT−1(p̃T−1,wT−1) = minsT−1
ET−1[exp(γp′T−1sT−1)V olT (p̃T , wT )]
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Nss,T−1 := GT + γΣt + Et[BT−1 +B′T−1]
Nws,T−1 := GT + γΣt − Et[A′T−1].




with corresponding value function











GT−1 := GT + γΣt −N′ws,T−1N−1ss,T−1Nws,T−1.
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Continuing backwards in this manner we find for j = T − 2, ..., t










s′jNss,jsj − (Nws,jwj)′sj +
1
2








s′jNss,jsj − (Nws,jwj)′sj +
1
2




Nss,j := Gj+1 + γΣt + Et[Bj +B′j]
Nws,j := Gj+1 + γΣt − Et[A′j]




with corresponding value function












Gj := Gj+1 + γΣt −N′ws,jN−1ss,jNws,j.
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The OLFC policy implements s∗t at time t, and we note that s
∗
t depends on wt only, and not
on the price, p̃t. The OLFC policy is path dependent, however, because of the dependence
of Nss,t and Nws,t on Σt, At and Bt which in general are stochastic. As mentioned in Section
3.5, it is also possible to model return predictability via linear state variable dynamics and
still compute the OLFC value function and policy analytically. This would induce an explicit
path dependence of s∗t on these state variables.
Note that the DP formulation here is equivalent to the static problem formulation in
Appendix B.1.3 if we drop the non-negativity constraints on the s∗t ’s there. It follows then
that we can check positive definiteness of the Nss,j’s for j ≥ t by confirming that QOLFC,t +
QΣ,t is positive definite. We can do the latter using, for example, the results of Appendix
B.2.1.
B.1.5 Using Control Variates to Estimate the Primal Bounds
In order to reduce the number of Monte-Carlo paths that we used for estimating the pri-
mal bound, Vub, we considered two possible control variates. First note that if a trading
sequence s := [s′0 . . . s
′
T ]
′ is deterministic, then the expected execution cost can be computed
































tst as a control variate. However as the level of risk aversion (as measured by γ)
increases, the variance reduction that it achieves will not be as effective.
The expected utility of a deterministic trading sequence cannot be computed analytically
when there are stochastic variance-covariance dynamics and stochastic linear price-impact
dynamics. However, if we assume the volatility, Σ, is constant, and At and Bt evolve
deterministically according to their time t = 0 conditional expectations, E0[At] and E0[Bt],











































and (B.1-25) as a control variate. Note that we
can do this even when each of Σt, At and Bt evolve stochastically in the “true” model by
simulating in parallel the model with deterministic price impacts and variance-covariance
dynamics that yields (B.1-25). In our numerical experiments we took Σ = Σ0 and took s
to be the optimal (deterministic) policy as calculated in Appendix B.1.4 with t = 0. We
generally find (B.1-25) to be much more effective than (B.1-24) and it resulted in a variance
reduction for the primal bounds on the order of 75% to 95% depending on the value of γ.
It is worth mentioning that these control variates provided little benefit when estimating
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the dual bounds. Since the calculation of the primal bound was the computational bottle-
neck, however, there was no need to construct good control variates for the dual problem.
B.2 The Dual Problem for the Portfolio Execution Prob-
lem




















































1 . . . A
′
1
. . . . . . . . . . . .















r1 + r2 + . . .+ rt
. . .
r1 + r2 + . . .+ rt + . . .+ rT

.
Using (B.2-2) we see that the gradient vector and Hessian matrix of f satisfy
∇f(s) = γf(s)(Qs+ cp,0)
∇2f(s) = γf(s)
(




If Q is positive definite, then the Hessian matrix ∇2f(s) is also positive definite and f(s)
is therefore convex. This follows because γ > 0, f(s) > 0 for all s and because (Qs +
cp,0)(Qs + cp,0)
′, as the outer-product of a column vector, is positive semi-definite for all
s. It therefore follows that if Q is positive definite then all dual problem instances will be
convex. In Appendix B.2.1, provide some sufficient conditions that ensure Q will be positive
definite.
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B.2.1 Conditions that Guarantee the Positive Definiteness of Q
and QOLFC,t
The positive definiteness of Q depends on the dynamics of At and Bt. Here we provide two
sufficient conditions that guarantee this.





t are positive semi-definite.
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The second matrix on the right-hand-side of (B.2-4) is positive definite since it is block-
diagonal and each 1
2
(A + A′) + Bt + B
′
t is positive definite. The first matrix is positive
semi-definite since for any given vector z = [z1 . . . zT ]
′ where each zi is n × 1 vector, we
have









. . . A′
. . . . . . . . . . . .














(z1+z2+ . . .+zT )
(B.2-5)
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which is non-negative since A+A
′
2
is positive definite. This implies Q is positive definite.
QOLFC,t in (B.1-19) has a similar structure to Q. Given the At’s are constant we have
Et[Aj] = A, and then
QOLFC,t =

A+A′ + Et[Bt +B′t] A′ . . . A′
A A+A′ + Et[Bt+1 +B′t+1] . . . A′
. . . . . . . . . . . .
A A . . . A+A′ + Et[BT +B′T ]

If the dynamics of Bt ensures that Et[Bj +B′j] are positive semi-definite, QOLFC,t is guar-
anteed to be positive definite by the same argument we used for (B.2-4).
B.2.2 Computing Dual Penalties
We saw in Section 3.3.1 that we would like to take Ṽt (required for (3.3.2)) to be a linearized
version of an approximate value function, V̂t, as given by (3.3.5). However, if we construct
V̂t using the OLFC value function, V
ol







we cannot compute Et[Ṽt+1(s0:t)] analytically. This is because V olt+1 is calculated under the
assumption that the conditional covariance matrix remains constant at Σt+1 and that the
price impact matrices for all j ≥ t + 1 are Et+1[Aj]’s and Et+1[Bj]’s. None of these terms
are adapted to Ft and so computing Et[Ṽt+1(s0:t)] analytically is not possible in general. We
could in theory use the Monte-Carlo approach of Section 3.5 to overcome this problem, but
in this particular case it would be prohibitively expensive to do so. This is because we would
need to solve an OLFC optimization problem at each simulated point at time t+ 1.
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Instead we simply modify the assumptions of the OLFC policy and assume that at time
t+ 1 the conditional covariance matrix remains constant at Σt (rather than Σt+1) and that
the price impact matrices are given by Et[Aj] and Et[Bj] (rather than Et+1[Aj] and Et+1[Bj])
for all j ≥ t + 1. Using precisely the same DP approach of Appendix B.1.4 we obtain the
modified OLFC value function











where the G̃t’s are the analog of the Gt’s in Appendix B.1.4. The important feature of
(B.2-6) is that G̃t+1 ∈ Ft so that Et[V molt+1 ] can be computed in closed form.
B.2.3 Solving Dual Problem Instances




tst). From (3.3.2) and (3.3.5) it follows that each
dual problem instance that we need to solve has an objective function equal to f(s) plus a
linear function of s. While all of the problem instances in our numerical experiments will be
convex, the exponential operator combined with the linear term can be a source of difficulty.
In addition, the permanent price impact implies that pt is a function of s0:t−1 so that we
cannot reduce the problem to a separable convex problem which is easily solved. Instead we
solve each dual problem instance by using the following SQP approach which is also applied
to the tax-aware portfolio allocation problem in Section 2.3.3:
1. Choose a starting point, ŝ.
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2. Approximate f(s) with a second order Taylor expansion about ŝ to obtain
f̂(s) := f(ŝ) +∇f(ŝ)′(s− ŝ) + 1
2
(s− ŝ)′∇2f(ŝ)(s− ŝ) (B.2-7)












which is a constrained convex quadratic programming problem and therefore easy to
solve. Let sopt be the optimal solution.
4. Evaluate the objective value in (3.3.2) at sopt, and stop if we have converged to within
a given error tolerance. Otherwise set ŝ = sopt and return to step 2.
In our numerical experiments we use an absolute error tolerance of 10−5. Depending on the
level of risk aversion, γ, this corresponds to a relative error tolerance between 10−4 and 10−5.
Typically we find that convergence occurs after just two or three iterations.
B.3 The Model of Bertsimas, Hummel and Lo
Bertsimas, Hummel and Lo [10] (BHL) was one of the earliest papers to consider the portfolio
execution problem. We use the calibrated model parameters of BHL to: (i) investigate
their conjecture that an OLFC policy should be close to optimal and (ii) provide a simple
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demonstration of how duality can be used to determine in advance whether or not a particular
market feature, in this case cross-price impacts, are worth accounting for in a portfolio
execution policy. In particular, by considering how small the calibrated cross-price impact
parameters are in BHL, it is reasonable to conjecture that simply following the optimal
single stock execution policies should be close to optimal. We confirm this by using the
single stock value functions to construct a dual penalty which we then use to bound how far
the single-stock policy is from optimality. This example therefore serves as an illustration of
how a policy and the dual penalty from a given model can be used to determine in advance
whether a more complicated model even needs to be considered. Note that we only claim to
show that cross-price impact parameters are insignificant within the model of Bertsimas et
al [10] and do not make this claim more generally.
B.3.1 Model Description
The linear percentage price-impact model of BHL has dynamics
pt = p̃t + δt (B.3-1)
δt = P̃t(AP̃tst +Btxt) (B.3-2)
p̃t+1 = exp(Diag(ϵt+1))p̃t (B.3-3)
xt+1 = Cxt + ηt+1 (B.3-4)
wt+1 = wt − st (B.3-5)
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where P̃t := Diag[p̃t], a diagonal matrix with p̃t on the diagonal. The execution price pt is
the sum of the no-impact price, p̃t, and the price impact, δt. p̃t follows a vector-geometric
Brownian motion, where the ϵt’s are IID normal with mean vector, µϵ, and covariance
matrix, Σϵ. The price impact, δt, is temporary and assumes the percentage impact is a
linear function of the dollar values, P̃tst, and an information vector, xt, that represents
market or private information and is assumed to follow a vector autoregressive process with
a one period time-lag. The ηt’s are IID multivariate normal with mean 0 and covariance
matrix, Ση.














and dynamics (B.3-1) to (B.3-5). This problem can be solved using dynamic programming
and explicit solutions for the optimal value function as well as the optimal trading quantities
can be found in BHL. When non-negativity constraints st ≥ 0 are imposed, however, then it
is not possible to solve this problem explicitly. Moreover, because of the return predictability
induced by xt, we expect the non-negativity constraints to be binding in general.
149
B.3.2 Sub-Optimal Policies
We consider several different sub-optimal policies that can be employed when non-negativity
constraints are imposed.
The Simple Policy: The agent buys the same quantity of shares in each of the T + 1
time periods so that st = w0/(T + 1).
A One-Step Look-Ahead Policy: At each time t the agent solves
min
st∈Ft
Et[p′tst + Vt+1(p̃t+1,xt+1,wt+1)] (B.3-6)
s.t. 0 ≤ st ≤ wt
and implements the optimal solution, sost , say. We take Vt+1 to be the value function for the
unconstrained problem which can be computed analytically via a matrix recursion. While
the calculations are somewhat tedious the expectation of Vt+1 conditional on Ft can be com-
puted in closed form.
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sj ≥ 0 for j = t, . . . , T.








corresponding optimal solution. The OLFC policy implements sol,tt at time t and ignores
sol,tt+1, . . . , s
ol,t
T .
The Single-Stock Execution Policy: Here the agent simply assumes the cross-price
impacts are zero in which case the problem decouples into n separate single-stock problems.
The agent solves each of these problems using a simple approximate dynamic programming
algorithm and implements the resulting policy. This policy was suggested by the fact that
the diagonal elements of the matrix A, as calibrated by BHL, were typically an order of mag-
nitude larger than the off-diagonal elements. This can be seen from Table B.2 in Appendix
B.3.4 where we display a 10 × 10 sub-matrix of the price impact matrix, A. We therefore
expected this policy to perform well. Moreover, this case provides a clear example of where
the duality technology could be used to determine whether or not a given policy, i.e. the
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n single stock policies, should be adapted to account for a new feature, i.e. the cross-price
impact costs, that are known to exist in the market-place.
B.3.3 The Dual Problem
A dual problem instance is obtained by simulating paths of p̃t and xt and then solving the
resulting deterministic optimization problem with a dual-feasible penalty that is obtained













s.t. pt = p̃t + P̃t(AtP̃tst +Btxt)
where the p̃t’s and xt’s have been simulated according to the true model dynamics and are
known to the decision-maker at time t = 0. We only consider Ṽt+1(s0:t)’s that are linear
in the actions, s0:t, and this can be achieved in the manner described in Section 3.3.1. In
the numerical results below, we compute dual bounds using penalties constructed from: (i)
the unconstrained value function, Vt and (ii) the value function, V
ss
t , obtained by summing
together the n single stock value functions.
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B.3.4 Numerical Results
We use the same calibration for {A,B,C,µϵ,Σϵ,Ση} as given by BHL. The agent therefore
needs to purchase 100, 000 shares in each of 25 securities. There are T +1 = 20 time periods.
Primal bounds are computed on the basis of 10, 000 Monte-Carlo paths while only 100 paths
were required to estimate the dual bounds. Monte-Carlo results are displayed in Table B.1.
We use V s, V os, V ol and V ss to denote the estimated average execution cost of the simple,
one-step look-ahead, OLFC and single-stock policies, respectively. The mean and standard
errors of the reported execution costs are cents per share. We also report run-times (in
seconds) for each of the policies with the exception of the simply policy whose value can
be determined analytically. Note that these run times are for the entire 10,000 paths. We
see that the OLFC policy yields the lowest execution cost but that all policies provide very
similar performance. We note, however, that computing the OLFC policy is particularly
time-consuming relative to the other policies.
Table B.1 also reports two dual bounds, V uncd and V
ss
d , that were obtained by using
the unconstrained value function and the single-stock ADP value function, respectively, to
construct dual penalties, Ṽt, in (B.3-8). We also report the unconstrained optimal value
function, V0, which is itself a lower bound on the optimal execution cost for the constrained
problem. We see the two dual bounds generated are very similar and are very close indeed
to the primal bounds.
Confirming the Conjecture of BHL
These results allow us to confirm the conjecture of BHL, namely that the OLFC policy
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Table B.1: Simulation results for the portfolio execution problem with non-negativity con-
straints.
sub-optimal policy dual bound





mean 5.364 4.123 3.979 4.194 2.023 3.976 3.975
std error 0 0.0523 0.0501 0.0542 0 0.00797 0.00404
run times N/A 324 7465 13.81 N/A 14.51 14.54
should be close to optimal. Indeed the average cost-per-share of the OLFC policy, 3.979
cents, is only .003 cents greater than the best dual bound.
Using the Dual Methodology to Determine Whether Cross-Price Impacts Need to be Included
We also note that if this problem were ever encountered in practice, then it would be possible
to “solve” it without constructing any of the more elaborate policies that explicitly account
for the cross-price impacts. To see this note that the average execution cost of the single-
stock policy is 4.194 cents-per-share and that the dual bound constructed by using the sum
of the single-stock value functions to construct dual penalties, is 3.975 cents-per-share. This
implies that building a more elaborate execution policy that incorporates the cross-price
impacts will be worth at most 4.194− 3.975 = .219 cents-per-share. As such, we may decide
that it is not worth explicitly accounting for the cross-price impacts, at least in this model.
This is one of the principal benefits of the dual technology.
We also mention here that we performed additional numerical experiments that included
sector balance constraints in the problem formulation. We again found that the various
policies performed very well, at least using the calibrated parameters of BHL.
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Table B.2: Price impact coefficients for a 10× 10 subset of the 25 stocks in BHL. All values
have been multiplied by 1010.
AHP AN BLS CHV DD DIS DOW F FNM GE
AHP 12.40 -1.69 -1.99 1.04 -1.07 1.09 1.26 1.37 -1.97 -0.17
AN -1.32 10.10 -1.96 1.09 -1.63 -1.24 2.68 -2.03 -0.80 -0.30
BLS 3.49 0.83 14.40 2.26 -2.45 4.25 -1.02 -5.80 1.68 1.18
CHV 2.09 -0.17 2.34 21.20 2.84 1.62 -0.03 3.60 -3.35 0.91
DD -0.93 0.66 6.18 1.55 11.70 -1.17 1.00 0.67 1.92 2.24
DIS 1.98 2.73 -0.30 -2.59 0.92 19.30 2.22 0.13 8.27 2.37
DOW -0.79 0.18 -3.88 -0.23 -1.59 -0.93 7.21 -3.18 1.66 0.05
F -0.23 0.66 3.29 -0.65 4.24 1.74 3.15 21.90 2.12 0.65
FNM 0.01 -0.92 -0.43 3.27 0.39 -3.57 3.40 2.78 13.70 -0.88
GE 0.77 -0.45 0.53 0.03 -0.41 -0.26 -1.10 0.12 1.60 5.06
B.4 Additional Calibration Details for Section 3.4
B.4.1 Variance-Covariance Dynamics




where Ωt is a diagonal matrix, F is a matrix of factor loadings and Υ is a diagonal matrix
of idiosyncratic variances. The diagonal elements in Ωt are assumed to follow independent
GARCH(1,1) processes.
Our calibration of the variance-covariance dynamics is very simple and is also based
on Alexander [1]. We first compute the variance-covariance matrix, Σ, of standardized
5-minute returns, treating the observations for each security as IID. We then perform a
principal components analysis on Σ, and then assume the first k principal components follow
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independent GARCH(1, 1) models. We emphasize here that we do not claim that this is a
particulary good choice of model. Indeed we expect the proprietary models that are used in
practice to be much better than our model which is only intended to help demonstrate how
the duality techniques can be used.
We use 5-minute return data on the 50 stocks between October 12 and October 25 2011
which corresponds to a total of d = 10 trading days. Ignoring time-of-day and other effects we
obtain a series of 10×78 = 780 observations that we initially treat as IID. After normalizing
each time series by subtracting the mean return, we compute the covariance matrix, Σ, of
the n = 50 normalized observation series. We then perform a principal components analysis
on Σ and obtain
Σ = ΓΛΓ′ (B.4-2)
where Γ is the matrix of eigenvectors, c1, . . . , cn say, and Λ is the diagonal matrix of corre-
sponding eigenvalues, λ1, . . . , λn, arranged in decreasing order. We let F be the n×k matrix
containing the k eigen vectors, c1, . . . , ck, corresponding to the k largest eigen values. We
now approximate the covariance matrix with
Σ ≈ FΩF′ +Υ (B.4-3)
where Ω = diag(λ1, . . . , λk) and Υ is a diagonal matrix chosen to ensure that the diagonal
terms on both sides of (B.4-3) agree. Note that λi is the variance of the i-th principal
component, ci.The eigenvalue analysis is shown in Table B.3 where we see that the first six
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principal components explain more than 90% of the total variance in the 50 return series.
We therefore chose k = 6. The problem with (B.4-3) is that it provides a static description
for the covariance-matrix, Σ. We can use it to create a dynamic model, however, by setting
Σt ≈ FΩtF′ +Υ (B.4-4)
where the diagonal elements of Ωt are assumed to follow independent GARCH(1, 1) pro-
cesses. In particular, let σi,t denote the value of the i-th diagonal element of Ωt. Then the
GARCH(1, 1) model for σi,t assumes





where ωi > 0 and αi, βi ≥ 0 are fixed parameters and ci,t is the value of the i-th principal
component at time t. The parameters for the six GARCH models were fitted using standard
MLE techniques and are given in Table B.4. We note that all t-statistics are significant.
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Table B.4: GARCH(1,1) parameter estimates for the top 6 principal components
ω α β
coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat
c1 0.1889 2.381 0.1563 3.988 0.7001 8.165
c2 0.1360 2.423 0.2519 4.198 0.3284 1.548
c3 0.0231 3.386 0.0885 3.822 0.7801 14.882
c4 0.0114 3.357 0.1671 5.02 0.7575 17.895
c5 0.0046 4.532 0.1845 4.971 0.7322 18.403
c6 0.0033 3.273 0.2052 5.471 0.7131 15.341
B.4.2 Parameter Values for Top 50 Stocks in the S&P
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Table B.5: Parameter values for top 50 stocks in the S&P.
Security Initial Average Daily Annual Permanent Linear Price Temporary Linear Price
Ticker price Volume (Million) Volatility Impact Coefficient ×109 Impact Coefficient ×106
AAPL 407.33 22.85 21.53% 178.3009 8.9150
ABT 52.47 24.65 21.55% 21.2826 1.0641
AIG 22.63 7.44 47.10% 30.4169 1.5208
AMGN 57.39 4.99 20.66% 114.9911 5.7496
AMZN 236.84 6.15 33.77% 385.3714 19.2686
AXP 45.93 10.36 31.70% 44.3491 2.2175
BAC 6.51 263.47 51.04% 0.2469 0.0123
BRK/B 74.03 6.44 24.55% 115.0245 5.7512
C 28.40 68.25 52.89% 4.1609 0.2080
CAT 81.80 10.63 37.09% 76.9853 3.8493
CMCSA 23.16 15.95 29.09% 14.5161 0.7258
COP 67.69 11.22 24.62% 60.3056 3.0153
CSCO 17.16 44.23 26.29% 3.8795 0.1940
CVS 34.44 8.04 19.53% 42.8311 2.1416
CVX 98.08 8.61 26.07% 113.9225 5.6961
DIS 32.95 10.10 25.96% 32.6170 1.6309
EMC 23.26 24.72 31.23% 9.4084 0.4704
GE 16.25 63.55 31.44% 2.5571 0.1279
GOOG 548.10 4.09 24.39% 1340.9765 67.0488
GS 98.05 7.83 41.66% 125.2213 6.2611
HD 34.92 10.67 24.01% 32.7156 1.6358
IBM 185.80 7.32 18.14% 253.9455 12.6973
INTC 23.00 84.04 24.81% 2.7367 0.1368
JNJ 64.10 11.39 18.39% 56.2684 2.8134
JPM 32.71 51.60 42.89% 6.3386 0.3169
KFT 34.67 8.23 16.83% 42.1164 2.1058
KO 67.22 16.75 16.81% 40.1212 2.0061
MCD 89.35 6.36 17.66% 140.5327 7.0266
MMM 76.77 5.19 28.50% 147.8743 7.3937
MO 27.89 11.77 19.24% 23.7031 1.1852
MRK 32.24 13.86 19.48% 23.2673 1.1634
MSFT 27.18 54.55 22.81% 4.9830 0.2491
ORCL 31.35 27.79 26.15% 11.2801 0.5640
OXY 81.25 4.72 35.25% 171.9937 8.5997
PEP 62.45 8.12 16.41% 76.9138 3.8457
PFE 18.85 36.61 23.23% 5.1491 0.2575
PG 64.71 9.26 13.87% 69.9185 3.4959
PM 65.82 8.40 19.55% 78.3178 3.9159
QCOM 52.29 13.83 28.01% 37.8144 1.8907
SLB 67.46 12.53 41.87% 53.8395 2.6920
T 28.83 24.74 16.46% 11.6527 0.5826
UNH 47.21 9.23 35.99% 51.1342 2.5567
UPS 68.32 4.67 23.28% 146.3456 7.3173
USB 24.15 18.35 37.35% 13.1607 0.6580
UTX 74.31 4.79 27.04% 155.0823 7.7541
V 90.99 3.97 25.88% 229.3355 11.4668
VZ 36.64 13.44 17.03% 27.2555 1.3628
WFC 26.38 48.78 39.73% 5.4085 0.2704
WMT 55.15 12.59 16.54% 43.8191 2.1910
XOM 76.87 21.67 20.25% 35.4807 1.7740
Appendix C
Review of Duality Based on
Information Relaxations
We begin with a general finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic program with a probability
space, (Ω,F ,P). Time is indexed by the set T := {0, . . . , T} and the evolution of information
is described by the filtration F = {F0, . . . ,FT} with F = FT . We make the usual assumption
that F0 = {∅,Ω} so that the decision maker starts out with no information regarding the
outcome of uncertainty. There is a state vector, xt ∈ Rn, whose dynamics satisfy
xt+1 = ft(xt, ut, wt+1), t = 0, . . . , T − 1 (C.0-1)
where ut ∈ Ut(xt) ⊆ Rm is the control taken at time t, wt+1 is an Ft+1-measurable random
disturbance and Ut(xt) is the feasible control set at time t. A feasible policy, u := (u0, . . . , uT )
is one where each individual action satisfies ut ∈ Ut(xt) for all t. We let U denote the
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set of such policies. A feasible adapted policy is a feasible policy that is Ft-adapted. We
let UF denote the set of all such Ft-adapted policies. For example, in the context of the
portfolio execution problem of Chapter 3, a feasible but not Ft-adapted strategy would be
an execution schedule that satisfies the non-negativity constraints in all time periods but
where the number of shares purchased in a given period is allowed to depend on prices in






where we assume without loss of generality that each gt(xt, ut) is Ft-measurable. In partic-
ular, the decision maker’s problem is then given by









where the expectation in (C.0-2) is taken over the set of possible outcomes, w = (w1, . . . , wT ) ∈
Ω. Letting V ∗t denote the time t value function for the problem (C.0-2), the associated dy-
namic programming recursion is given by
V ∗t (xt) := inf
ut∈Ut(xt)
{
gt(xt, ut) + Et
[
V ∗t+1 (ft(xt, ut, wt+1)
]}
t = 0, . . . , T (C.0-3)
with the understanding that V ∗T+1 ≡ 0 (and therefore does not depend on wT+1 which is
undefined). In practice of course it is often too difficult or time-consuming to perform the
iteration in (C.0-3). This can occur, for example, if the state vector, xt, is high-dimensional
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or if the constraints imposed on the controls are too complex or difficult to handle. In such
circumstances, we must be satisfied with sub-optimal policies. These policies are generally
easy to simulate and can therefore be used to construct unbiased upper bounds on the
optimal value function, V ∗0 (x0). Duality methods based on information relaxations can be
used to construct lower bounds on V ∗0 (x0).
We will now briefly describe the theory behind these duality methods. BSS [16] should be
consulted for further details. We omit most of the technical details and we will only consider
perfect information relaxations as these relaxations are usually most useful in practice and are
all that we will require in this disertation. Let S denote the space of real-valued measurable
functions that are defined on the state space Rn. We now define an operator ∆ that maps
S to the space of real-valued measurable functions on Rn × Rn × Rm according to
(∆Vt)(xt, xt−1, ut−1) := Vt(xt) − E [Vt(xt) |xt−1, ut−1] . (C.0-4)
Loosely speaking, ∆ is an operator on (approximate) value functions. Note in particular that
E0 [(∆Vt)(xt, xt−1, ut−1)] = 0 for all integrable Vt. Let D be the space of real-valued functions
on Rn × T such that if V ∈ D then Vt := V (·, t) is measurable and E0 [|Vt(xt)|] < ∞ for all
t ∈ T and all feasible policies u ∈ U . We now define an operator F : D → S according to








(gt(xt, ut) − (∆Vt)(xt, xt−1, ut−1))





Note that the infimum in (C.0-5) is over the space U of feasible policies and not the space
UF of feasible adapted policies. Our first result is weak duality.
Theorem C.0.1. (Weak Duality) V ∗0 (x0) ≥ FV (x0) for all V ∈ D.
Proof: Using the definition of V ∗0 (x0) in (C.0-2) and the fact that the (∆Vt)’s have zero
mean we have




















(gt(xt, ut) − (∆Vt)(xt, xt−1, ut−1))










(gt(xt, ut) − (∆Vt)(xt, xt−1, ut−1))
}∣∣∣∣∣ x0 = x
]
= FV (x0).  (C.0-7)
Theorem C.0.1 suggests that we can compute a lower bound on V ∗0 (x0) by evaluating FV (x0)
for any V ∈ D. It gives no guidance, however, on how to choose V so that the lower bound




Theorem C.0.2 below is a strong duality result which states that the dual problem is solved
by taking V = V ∗ and that there is no duality gap between the primal DP and the dual
problem.
Theorem C.0.2. (Strong Duality) For all x, V ∗0 (x) = FV
∗(x).
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Proof: By weak duality we need only show that FV ∗(x) ≥ V ∗0 (x). We have








(gt(xt, ut) − (∆V ∗t )(xt, xt−1, ut−1))











gt(xt, ut) + E
[
V ∗t+1(xt+1) |xt, ut
]
− V ∗t (xt)
]
+ gT (xT , uT )− V ∗T (xT )
}∣∣∣∣∣ x0 = x
]
≥ V ∗0 (x) (C.0-9)
where the inequality in (C.0-9) follows because of (C.0-3) and since V ∗T (xT ) = gT (xT , uT ). 
Strong duality suggests that we might be able to obtain good dual bounds on the optimal
value function, V ∗0 (x), if we can find V ≈ V ∗ and then compute FV (x). The numerical
experiments for the portfolio execution problem of Chapter 3 and in the literature cited in
Section 3.1 support this claim.
Remark C.0.1. The portfolio execution problem that we consider in Chapter 3 has an objec-














as we assumed in (C.0-2) but this does not present any problems because we can introduce an
additional state variable, zt say, with dynamics zt+1 = zt+p
′
t+1st+1 for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 with
z0 := p
′
0s0. We can then take g0 ≡ g1 ≡ · · · ≡ gT−1 ≡ 0 and gT := exp (γzT ). The portfolio
execution problem now has an objective function of the appropriate form. We also note that
given any policy, θ say, the corresponding time t+ 1 value function, V θt+1, can be written as


















where the expectation Eθt+1[·] is with
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respect to the probability measure induced by the policy θ. This also explains why we want to
include the first term on the right-hand side of (3.3.3).
